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THE

POLICY OF ENGLAND

TOWARDS

SPAIN

CONSIDERED CHIEFLY WITH REFERENCE

TO

“ A REVIEW OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF
THE BASQUE PROVINCES, AND A FEW REMARKS ON
RECENT EVENTS IN SPAIN, &c. BY AN ENGLISH NOBLE-
MAN.”

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THE POLICY

OF

ENGLAND TOWARDS SPAIN.

A BOOK has been published* which, although anonymous, is generally supposed, and we believe admitted, to be from the pen of Lord Carnarvon, a nobleman whose honourable political character and distinguished abilities must always command a respectful deference for his opinions, and whose literary attainments never fail to prepossess his readers in favour of the author and his subject.

The following remarks have reference to the second part of Lord Carnarvon's work, which treats of those recent events in Spain, which now occupy a considerable share of public attention, and which will, doubtless, be brought into discussion when Parliament meets.

Both at home and abroad it is a constant matter of surprise that the great mass of the people of England should, upon all questions of foreign po-

* Portugal and Galicia, with a Review of the Social and Political State of the Basque Provinces, and a few remarks on recent events in Spain. 2 vols.—Murray.

litics, display an ignorance and an apathy which appear totally inconsistent with the vast intelligence, and the lively sense both of public and private interests at home, which distinguish every class of society in this country. That such, however, is indisputably the case, the debates in Parliament are sufficient to prove.

A few nights in every Session are devoted to Foreign Affairs. Motions are made, with reference rather to party purposes than to the intrinsic objects of the questions—they are feebly debated and coldly listened to ; and unless some flagrant case should arise upon which a Government may be overthrown, the House and the public appear alike indifferent to the manner in which the Foreign Secretary may have parried the attack, or repelled his opponents—the debate is only looked upon as an interruption to domestic affairs—it is got over and forgotten. Neither within nor without the walls of Parliament, is information upon foreign affairs much *sought* after—but there is no indisposition to *receive* it at the hands of him who may be at the pains of giving it. With respect to foreign affairs more than any others, there is a difficulty in arriving at facts, and to avoid the trouble of thinking, a readiness to adopt the opinions of others, more particularly when presented in a complete and decided form.

The Spanish question certainly occupies the public mind. No man who lives in society and

reads the newspapers or frequents the clubs of London, can fail to be aware of this—but if he analyzes what he hears, he will admit that it is not the Spanish part of the question that creates this general interest. With respect to that, there is weariness and disgust, or at best indifference. It is the fate of our countrymen who compose the Auxiliary Legion, and their constant correspondence with the newspapers—it is the communications from San Sebastian, and not from Madrid, which keep alive the public feelings; and above all it is the little progress which it is considered has been latterly made by the partizans of the Queen, that the Tories think they shall be able to turn to their own advantage; and thus all those who have to hope or fear from a change of Government, are watching with the anxiety which self-interest inspires the march of events in the Peninsula.

Lord Carnarvon's work upon the Basque Provinces has appeared at the moment best calculated to serve the party of which his Lordship is a distinguished member—the moment when the Parliamentary plan of campaign is about to be settled, and when the points of attack against the Government are to be chosen. If, however, we judge Lord Carnarvon rightly, he is not a mere partizan but a sincere lover of the truth, which he would always be willing to seek without fearing the results of investigation. We are convinced, therefore, that his Lordship's work contains nothing but

the expression of what he himself believes, and that if we should be able to point out any errors into which he has fallen, or to disprove by arguments certain positions which he has maintained, his Lordship will be far from regretting that the author of these remarks should have undertaken to rectify public opinion by a statement of much that is within his own personal knowledge.

The early portion of the chapter upon the Basque Provinces abounds with proofs that Lord Carnarvon is but imperfectly acquainted with the history of the epoch of which he is treating. Some of the errors into which his Lordship has fallen, it will be necessary to notice, first, because he deduces from them conclusions favourable to the view he supports; and next, in order to shew how little dependence is to be placed upon the sources of information to which his Lordship must have had recourse.

Lord Carnarvon (p. 188. vol. ii.) says, that Don Carlos disavowed all connection with the insurgents “(of 1827), he reprobated their schemes,” and “asserted his royal brother’s right, without equivocation or reserve.” It is perfectly true, that Don Carlos never openly avowed his connection with the party who wished to place him upon the throne of his brother; but it is as incorrect to say that he disavowed them. Ferdinand, immediately upon his return to Spain, in 1814, appointed Don Carlos generalissimo of the army, and but a short time elapsed before he saw reason to entertain doubts as

to the allegiance and loyalty of his brother. Don Carlos refused to satisfy those doubts, and the King continued to find increasing cause for jealousy. In 1822, a Carlist mutiny broke out in the regiment of which Don Carlos himself was the colonel. Neither threat nor persuasion could induce him to punish the offence, or to disavow his connection with its authors. The same unvarying course he subsequently pursued—without the will to act loyally towards the King, he lacked the moral courage openly to take part against him; and secretly wishing well to the intrigues carried on in his name, he left to others the management of these intrigues, and the consequences of failure. The “cuarto”^{*} of Don Carlos was governed by the infanta his wife, and by her sister the Princess of Beira (the ambitious views and restless spirit of these two princesses are but too well known), and was considered by the Court, and the public of Spain, as the focus of intrigue, from which sprang the never-ending plots and conspiracies which disturbed the tranquillity of the country. An assertion that Don Carlos was ignorant of, or not privy to, all that was going on in his name, and under his own eyes, would excite the laughter of all those acquainted with the recent history of Spain. That he was not so, is proved by his constant refusal to disavow, or to reprobate, the acts of the conspirators, a step which he well knew

* The apartments of the Infants in the palace.

would at once have put an end to them. To imagine that a large number of persons should, for a succession of years, conspire against a reigning monarch (whose age and health offered no prospect but that of a long life), in defiance of the wishes of the heir presumptive to the throne, is to shew little knowledge of human nature, and still less of Spanish character.

Lord Carnarvon says (p. 189) that the King was induced, "after much hesitation and frequent change of purpose, to nominate on his death-bed a female to the throne, and thus bequeath a civil war to the country."—The King died in the autumn of 1833, the will, changing the order of succession, is dated the 12th of June, 1830! At La Granja, in 1832 the King was dangerously ill; indeed his death was officially announced by the telegraph of Bayonne to the French Government, and then, it is true that his Majesty exhibited "hesitation," and "change of purpose"—but it was upon the subject of altering his will and rechanging the order of succession. When the hand of death seemed to be upon him, and the King was almost in a state of insensibility, his confessor and the minister Calomarde, induced him to settle the crown upon Don Carlos; and the Queen, upon being informed that her consent to this change, which deprived her daughter of the throne, was necessary for the satisfaction of the King's conscience and for the comfort of his dying moments, with a generosity that

has few parallels in history, gave it. The King recovered, and indignant at the advantage which had been taken of expiring weakness, he reversed the act which had been extorted from him. He imprisoned the traitor Calomarde; and several months before his death assembled a general Cortes of the kingdom, in order to take the oath of allegiance to the Princess of Asturias. How different is this statement of *facts* from the one put forward by Lord Carnarvon!

Although Lord Carnarvon declines (p. 189) to "investigate the delicate question of the succession," we deem it expedient to say a few words, upon a matter which appears to us extremely simple.

Since the time of the Goths, who elected their kings, the capacity of females to succeed to the throne has been an established and undisputed usage in Spain. Thus, between the years 1028 to 1422, five different females either occupied the throne, or were acknowledged heiresses to the crown in default of male issue—and in 1469, Isabel the Catholic succeeded to her brother Henry IV., as Queen of Castille.

Juana la Loca (the mad), daughter of the Catholic King, by virtue of this right of female succession, which at that time was formally inscribed in the law of Partidas, was declared Queen of Spain in 1505,—and in 1518, the Cortes of Valladolid proclaimed her son Charles V., with the

reservation that if ever the Queen recovered her reason, the government of the kingdom should be restored to her by her son. By the right of female succession, then, the House of Austria reigned in Spain. By the same right, the Bourbons have occupied the throne. Charles II., the last Sovereign of the house of Austria, yielding on his death-bed to intrigues, similar to those which were supposed to have been practised upon the dying Ferdinand, named as his successor, Philip of Anjou, thereby recognising the rights of his sister, the wife of Louis XIV., notwithstanding her formal renunciation of them. One of the early acts of Philip V.'s reign was to abolish the ancient order of succession, by virtue of which alone he had obtained the crown. For this purpose he assembled a mock Cortes in 1713, and disregarding the remonstrances of the Council of State, he proclaimed the Salic Law to be the law of the land by his sovereign will and pleasure, and *notwithstanding the law of Partidas*. This arbitrary and insolent decree was not registered in the form usual with similar acts, and no occasion offered itself for trying its validity: but the Cortes of Cadiz in 1812, representing the people of Spain, and acting in the name of the King, abolished the decree of Philip, by re-establishing the ancient law de Partidas, and the right of female succession to the crown. These Cortes were influenced by no individual or party motives, and they had no reason to contemplate any case in which the application of

the Salic Law might arise. Their task was to re-establish the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and to form a Code suited to the wants and customs of the people; and in the fulfilment of their duty, they abolished the despotic act of a sovereign which violated the law of Partidas he had sworn to observe upon his accession to the throne. It was in conformity with the law of Partidas, and with the immemorial usage of the country, that Ferdinand on his part abolished the Salic Law in Spain, and called a general Cortes of the kingdom to confirm his act. By nominating his daughter, on whose side were law, right, and custom, Ferdinand did not "bequeath a civil war," (p. 189) but it was the pretensions of Don Carlos that have inflicted that curse upon the country.

"The constitutionalists (p. 190) warmly professed their allegiance to the Queen, &c."; there is a fallacy in the use of the term constitutionalists by Lord Carnarvon, which is not without its object, for at the time of the King's death, the Queen's cause, if it had been supported by such adherents, would at once have become unpopular with the nation. But no such party existed, and nobody dreamed of re-establishing the constitution, the memory of which was held in general aversion. It is true, that men who wished to be no longer governed despotically, and those who thought Spain fit for some form of representative government, professed their allegiance to the Queen, not because

(p. 190) “the questionable nature of her daughter’s title would compel her to look to them for assistance”—but because the political system, which it was evident she would be obliged to adopt, was in harmony with their opinions, and the only one by which both she and they could combat the party, who for years had been making war upon the insufficient despotism of the King, and who, during the latter period of his life, had declared their determination that he should be succeeded by his brother.

That the “natural disposition and original intentions of the Queen, indisposed her to such an alliance,” is disproved by her conduct during her regency at the time of the King’s illness, and he upon his recovery disapproved and reversed many of her acts, upon the ground of their being unnecessarily favourable to the liberal party.

Equally incorrect is it to say (p. 190) that “the greater portion of that considerable party which adhered to the ancient institutions of the country, beheld with indignation the sudden change effected in the succession.” The Queen was recognised by the whole of the Grandees of Spain, and by all the important classes of society; and, except in the Basque Provinces, she was proclaimed amidst general rejoicings in every town and village; and addresses of loyalty and congratulation were transmitted to Madrid from every part of the kingdom, as well as from the colonies. When therefore Lord Car-

narvon states on behalf of the "considerable party," that "they looked upon the royal testament as the result of a conspiracy to defraud the rightful heir, and as the fruit of an unworthy influence exercised upon the almost unconscious mind of the dying king," he must excuse us, if, with reference to the facts we have detailed respecting the date of the King's will, and his dying moments, we look upon the statement as altogether imaginary.

Even upon his Lordship's own showing, there is no trifling discrepancy in his statements ; for (p. 191) he says that the Queen's government were "fully prepared for the coming emergency, and all the resources of the state had been long directed to the attainment of a single object;" one or the other statement, we submit, must be incorrect—either the King did not nominate his daughter in his last moments, or the Queen's government had not long been fully prepared for the event.

The fact is that both are incorrect, though not in the same degree: the first statement is entirely so—the latter is so with respect to the Queen's government being "fully prepared." Spanish want of foresight was, perhaps, never more signally displayed than during the year which preceded the King's death, when he was known to have a mortal disease, and when the Queen's party *should*, therefore, have been fully prepared for an event which might any hour have occurred. But so far were they from taking proper precautions, that Don

Carlos was permitted to remain in Portugal, without any remonstrances having been made to Don Miguel against retaining him there—no measures were taken for disarming the royalist volunteers, whose numbers amounted to nearly 300,000, and whose internal organization was well calculated to favour and promote an *esprit de corps*—the greater part of the regular army was permitted to be absent on furlough, and so little had the adherence of that portion which remained under arms been secured, that the utmost anxiety and alarm were felt when, owing to some couriers having gone astray, the declarations of allegiance of Generals Sarsfield and Rodil, who commanded the only effective corps, were not received at Madrid for some days after they were expected.

Other errors, equally glaring, we might point out, but as they do not materially affect the main question which Lord Carnarvon discusses, we shall at once proceed to offer a few remarks upon the reasons why, “during three years of profound external peace (p. 195) the arms and resources of the Spanish monarchy have made no sensible impression on the revolted provinces, and why its best appointed armies have been baffled.”

To those who have not actually been in the insurgent provinces, it is almost impossible to convey an accurate idea of the difficulties which a regular army has to contend with, in a country full of mountains, where every rock is an inaccessible for-

tress, where no supplies are to be found, and where the population is composed of active and intelligent enemies. These difficulties will, perhaps, be more easily understood by recollecting, that the operations and efforts of the French army, in 1809, were entirely defeated by Mina, with a handful of men; and that this general, in the same country, where two years ago he completely failed against the Carlist faction, succeeded, in 1809, in baffling, with 7,000 ill-appointed troops, 40,000 French, commanded by some of the best officers of the empire. Yet the French army possessed greater advantages than that of the Queen, for they had two bases of operations—one the Ebro, the other the Bidassoa; and were able to provide for all their wants, both military and administrative.

This circumstance was of vital advantage to them, as it has now been to the Carlists, who have existed by means of the supplies they drew from France; and the day that the line of the French frontier can be closed against them, the war may be considered at an end.

The war made by the French in Spain was a foreign war of conquest: the present is looked upon as a civil war of principles, privileges, dynasty, and even of religion, according to the term given to it by the priests, its great and most important supporters. The French had the advantage of their distinct nationality and different language, and desertion from their ranks was unheard of—every

straggler was put to death. From the Queen's army desertion is easy ; the hostile camps are contiguous—a private injury, the desire for revenge, a hope of bettering his condition, or a hundred other motives, may induce the soldier of the Queen to desert ; and he does not consider that the same disgrace attaches to him, for choosing to call himself Carlist instead of Christino, as if he had passed over to a foreign enemy : while the country people, through the medium of a common language, seduce the soldiers, and exercise an *espionage*, in its utmost extent, over the Queen's army.

The French had only to contend with irregular troops, who, although brave, carried on but a guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla officers were of the same class as the soldiers, and knew little more than they did. Don Carlos's army, in addition to all the advantages of guerrillas, has acquired a regular organization, having been instructed and commanded by officers of the Spanish and French armies. Every man, even when left to himself, knows the best way of injuring his enemy, and can march alone through the whole extent of country, as safely and as well provided for as if he was with his corps. The French had not only the best troops in the world, but their administration was perfect—their resources boundless—and their own country was contiguous to the theatre of war. Their operations were never paralysed by hunger

and misery, while the Queen's army is often in want of daily subsistence.

Yet with all these advantages, the French army failed in the Basque Provinces, and it is not to be wondered at that the Queen's army, which has never been sufficiently numerous or well supplied fully to occupy the country, should hitherto have failed likewise. The Carlists, occupying the centre of the insurgent provinces, have always been able to direct their forces against any part of the circumference occupied by the Queen's troops, and they have established a system of signals on the tops of the mountains, by which every movement of the Queen's army from Vitoria is immediately communicated to the Carlist Commander-in-chief, who is thus enabled to send orders either to troops to guard the passes and defiles through which the Christinos are to march, or to the peasantry to quit their villages and drive away their cattle. Under this system, the country is at any moment rendered a complete desert, and the Queen's army has upon more than one occasion marched four or five days together, without a peasant being seen, or a single article of provisions being discovered.

No information can ever be procured respecting the movements of the enemy, and no person can be found to carry a communication between the positions occupied by the Queen's army, though any sum of money be offered for the service—whereas every place where the troops are quartered is full

of Carlist spies, who instantly communicate intelligence of an intended movement, and the enemy never fails to be found on the spot most advantageous to him, and ready, though sometimes after a march of sixteen leagues, to fight, if he can do so on superior conditions, or to disperse under orders where to reunite again.

In short, the character of Navarre, and the greater part of Biscay, when occupied by an armed force to which the population is friendly, and which is supplied across the frontier of France with all that it stands in need of, enables the commander of that force to turn the campaign into a siege—a siege where the besieged may perpetually change the citadel, and always renew the combat with fresh advantage—where the besieger on the contrary, encumbered with a large attacking force, is continually drawn from his depots and magazines, and in case of changing his position or falling back upon his supplies, is liable to the sallies of the well-informed besieged, and to be cut to pieces in the gorges of the mountains.

If the contest were to be settled in the plains, though with an advantage of double numbers on the Carlist side, it would not last a month—but the character of the country to which it is confined, may make it eternal, and it is from that cause alone that all the Queen's generals have successively found in Navarre the grave of their reputations, and why ex-lieutenants of the guards, priests, and

smugglers, have risen to eminence in the service of Don Carlos.

We now come to that part of Lord Carnarvon's work, which treats of the privileges of the Basques, and it is no agreeable task to disfigure with facts the glowing picture his Lordship has drawn of the customs, the rights, the history, and the loyalty of that interesting people. Neither perhaps is the task an easy one, for Lord Carnarvon has so blended real with imaginary facts, has supplied so many effects with convenient causes, and has so ingeniously made ancient history stand for modern practice, that after an attentive perusal of his statement, and a comparison of it with that which really exists, the word that occurred to our mind, and which best embodied our feelings upon it, was *Romance*. His Lordship may further be assured that were his work translated and circulated throughout the whole of Spain, including the Basque Provinces, the same idea would present itself to the minds of the vast majority of his readers, though many might rejoice, that upon the authority of a British nobleman, such a tale was likely to gain credence with the British public.

It would be tedious to our readers, and irrelevant to the question, to follow Lord Carnarvon closely through his narration; and we therefore propose to state that which really has occurred, and to leave the reader to judge between the two versions, promising, however, to hold ourselves

responsible for the accuracy of our own. We will, moreover, admit the correctness of the ancient Basque history cited by Lord Carnarvon, but we object to the process of induction by which he seeks to make that history applicable to the present times. If ancient chronicles were considered sound materials for modern history, a charming picture of all the rest of modern Spain, as well as of Biscay, might be easily drawn ; for nowhere has the representative system higher authority and brighter examples than in the annals of Aragon, Catalonia, and Castille. Nowhere have the people and nobles in Cortes assembled assumed a more majestic appearance, or controlled the encroachments of the Crown with more vigour and independence. But what would this prove as to their actual state ? A writer upon Switzerland, who drew his materials from the history of the wars of Burgundy, and studiously kept out of view recent negotiations, and all that has conduced to the present condition of Switzerland, might paint a glowing picture of the stern freedom, and unbending patriotism of the people of that classic land of liberty ; but such an appeal to the imaginations of his readers would fail in leading them to think that similar sentiments now animate the Swiss, because the history of the Swiss cantons is well known. The history of the Basque Provinces is not known, and a writer upon them may, therefore, take advantage of the ignorance of his readers, and of the desire that all

would be inclined to feel, that other times and altered circumstances should not render modifications inevitable in that which was originally excellent.

And thus it has come to pass in the Basque Provinces, where the greater part of the privileges have been annulled de facto, though the despotic Sovereigns of Spain have been too wise to do so by formal decrees. *Divide et impera* was the principle of the Spanish kings, and the more the different provinces could be kept asunder by distinct systems of government, the less danger there was of their uniting together against the Crown. A few instances will serve to shew how, in latter years, the Basque privileges have been virtually set aside with the tacit consent of the people.

In 1818, a general levy of troops was made, for the purpose of sending an expedition to South America. The Basque provinces, notwithstanding their privileges, were ordered to furnish their quota; no resistance was offered, but the Basques offered to give money instead of men, and the money was more acceptable to the king. They tendered six millions of rials, and were ordered to pay ten, which they did.

Lord Carnarvon (p. 256) would, by inference, lead us to believe that the Inquisition had never entered the frontiers of the Basque Provinces; such however, is not the case, but to have openly established it there would have been an unnecessary

violation of the privileges. The provinces were, therefore, attached to Logrono, which was made the central point of the "Holy Office" in that part of the country, and the nomination of Commissioners, as in the rest of Spain, was given to the parish curates, and thus the boasted privileges were respected in form, but in substance trampled under foot.

They were equally disregarded in Navarre. But whenever the Cortes of Navarre meet, for the purpose of voting a contribution to the King, the Viceroy is first compelled to declare, and to sign an act to the effect, that the divers transgressions which he has committed against the privileges of the Province have been arbitrary and illegal. The Viceroy declares and signs ; the Cortes are closed ; and the privileges are again violated, as before.

Equally an illusion is it to say, that in recent, as in olden times, liberty and property have been inviolable. During the ten years preceding Ferdinand's death, the property of those suspected of liberal opinions was unmercifully confiscated, while a vigorous police and royalist volunteers, though under other names, were established, as in other parts of Spain.

Numerous similar instances might be given, to shew how fallacious is the assertion, that these provincial privileges have been maintained ; but enough has been said to shew that they have long since ceased to have any real and practical existence.

Their nominal existence has not been attacked, though often threatened, and probably for a private object; for the Deputy from the Provinces, who came to Madrid to watch over their interests on such occasions, usually found some solid arguments for convincing the Minister of the inexpediency of his measure. The Kings of Spain, we repeat, with a view to the maintenance of absolute power, have always deemed it expedient not to *abolish* the privileges.

Those privileges which really affect the people, and respecting which public opinion can with success be appealed to, in the provinces, have been exaggerated into an importance which they do not possess, with relation either to the war or the government, or to the interest of the provinces. The privileges are of two kinds; the one relates to the municipal institutions, and to the internal system of administration which no one, since the King's death, has ever had any idea of changing: the other consists of commercial privileges which all the provinces in turn have denominated *privations*.

The provinces have the privilege of importing foreign goods duty free, but it could not be expected, and never was allowed, that they should be permitted to extend this advantage to other provinces, and under cover of their own privileges destroy the customs revenue of Spain.

The Custom Houses, therefore, which the privi-

leges do not allow of at the sea-ports, are placed upon the frontiers of Castille; and the same system both of prevention on the one hand, and of contraband on the other, are established there, which prevail on the Swiss and Belgian frontiers of France. The Basque Provinces, in short, as a necessary consequence of their privileges, have long been treated, with respect to commerce, as a foreign nation by the rest of Spain. They were forbidden to trade with the Americas—Spanish colonial goods were not allowed to be imported direct to their ports—their vessels were looked upon as foreign, and the Basques, moreover, were placed upon the same footing as foreigners with respect to those productions of Spain which are absolutely necessary to them for their own consumption; while their own productions, being treated as foreign, were subject to enormous duties upon entering Castille.

The consequences of such a state of things may be easily conceived; they are the same as exist in some other countries at this moment. The sea-port towns and the manufacturers are hostile to a system which destroys foreign trade and excludes their productions from a profitable market, while the inland people and those who dwell upon the frontier are violent in support of the system, which necessarily creates the enormous smuggling trade by which they have enriched themselves.

There accordingly exists throughout the exempted

provinces every variety of opinion respecting their privileges, some desiring to be altogether assimilated to the rest of Spain, others claiming to be put upon a commercial equality with the neighbouring provinces ; while a third, and the most numerous party, not venturing to put forward their real motives against any change of a commercial system which is manifestly injurious to their country, clamour for the absolute maintenance of the privileges, and under the mask of patriotism advocate their right to fill their own pockets by smuggling.

Representations have frequently been made from the Juntas and assemblies of these provinces to the Government of Madrid, complaining that no population can prosper under such privileges ; and stating that they were most willing to give up the right of importing foreign manufactures duty free in exchange for the permission to sell their own productions to the rest of Spain. San Sebastian, after petitioning for years, has at length obtained from the Government the *privilege* of having a custom-house. And it was natural enough that the barren mountains of Biscay should look down with envy on the fertile plains and on the abundant harvests of Castille while starving on their own iron ; and the foreign manufactures which they imported, although received duty free, cost them dear, for they had but little, which foreigners want, to give in exchange for them.

The question, then, stripped of its history and its poetry, and analysed with reference to the bearings upon it of public opinion in the Basque provinces, resolves itself into the highly unromantic one of a tariff. The question whether foreign merchandise shall be subjected to duty at San Sebastian and Bilbao, and whether the iron of Biscay and the corn of Castille shall continue to be interchanged against law by the smugglers of the frontier.

We have the authority of the Junta of Alava for saying that the privileges have nothing, and never had anything, to do with the war. In a representation made to the Government and the Cortes by that body in 1834, and agreed to by all the principal men of the province, it is said, that "perhaps there are persons who believe that the men, who have been employed in those provinces in fighting against the legitimate Government, have been moved thereto, and are still urged on by the fear of losing the *fueros*, wishing to deduce therefrom that in chastisement they should be deprived of them. It would be a real injustice to the good sense and intelligence of the Government and the Cortes, and of all the enlightened part of the nation, if we were to suppose them ignorant of the true origin of the sole cause that has given impulse to the revolutionary movement in those provinces as in others of the kingdom. There is absolutely nothing of the *fueros* in it, nor even have they

served, nor do they serve as a pretext. Pure fanaticism, with its ambition and its thirst for power, is the only agent of these and other convulsions which have agitated the realm."

But the fact is, that every body in the country who has given to the contest a moment of serious consideration, is aware that the causes which have concentrated the war in the Basque Provinces, are to be found in the geographical position of those provinces. What did Zumalacarregui care about the *fueros* of Biscay? What did a crowd of other chiefs who have raised factions? Carnicer, Cuesta, Cuevillas, Basilio, &c.? What interest in the *fueros* had the ex-officers of the guard who have flocked to the provinces? Who has been more active and mischievous than the Cura Merino in the cause of fanaticism? But it was not for Biscayan privileges that he contended; and why was he put down in a few months? Not because he had no *fueros Vascongados* to fight for, but because he had no mountain fortresses to protect him from the vigorous attacks of the Queen's troops. But even within the little precinct to which the war is confined there exists a vast difference of political opinion, as well as opposite views with respect to the *fueros*. The great valley of Roncal has declared for the Queen. The Siete Valles are in her favour, and so is the half of Navarre. The numerous population of the Bastan only demand arms and protection against the Carlists to follow the example, and

it is well known that in many other parts of the Basque Provinces, the people no longer believing in the false tales by which their simplicity was imposed upon, exhausted by the war and despairing of its termination, only delay declaring for the Queen till they feel assured they shall not again (as has already, to the shame of the Queen's Generals, occurred) be exposed to the exterminating vengeance of their present masters, for having dared to espouse the cause they thought most advantageous to themselves.

But if the Basques are fighting *for* their privileges, what is it that the town of Bilboa has been fighting *against*? Can we have a greater proof that it is fanaticism and not *fueros* that maintains the cause of Don Carlos than the heroic conduct of Bilboa in its different sieges, though this once flourishing and most loyal town may be supposed to have as much interest as any other part of the country in the maintenance of Biscayan privileges? And yet Bilboa has resisted all the forces of Don Carlos, commanded by his best officers and aided by foreign engineers, being an open town without fortifications, and, as a military position, pronounced indefensible. It has held out contrary to all the rules of art, solely by the native valour and resolution of its inhabitants, who, wonderful to relate, have resolved rather to perish amidst the ruins of their houses than yield to the generous champion of their country's privileges; and is not

this single fact enough to sweep away all the nonsense which is talked about privileges and fueros?

The King died on the 30th of September, and on the 5th of October the Queen Regent issued a manifesto to the nation, upon the grounds that "The expectation which a new reign always excites increases with the doubts as to the public administration during the minority of the new monarch, and in order to dissipate this, and to allay the uneasiness and disorder which it produces in men's minds, I have considered it my duty to prevent unfounded conjectures and suppositions by a firm and frank manifestation of the principles by which I must constantly be guided in the Government with which I am charged by the last will of the King, my august consort, during the minority of the Queen, my very dear and beloved daughter, Donna Isabel."

After an assurance that the Catholic religion, its doctrines, its temples, and its ministers should be the first and most grateful care of her Government, the Queen Regent proceeds to say, "I entertain the most complete conviction that it is my duty to preserve intact the deposit of the royal authority that has been confided to me. I will religiously maintain the form and the fundamental laws of the monarchy, without admitting dangerous innovations, which, however alluring in principle, have already for our misfortune been too much attempted. The best form of Government for a country

is that to which it is accustomed. A stable and compact power, based upon ancient laws, respected by custom, consecrated by ages, is the most powerful instrument for working out the good of the people, which is not obtained by weakening authority, by combating established ideas, habits, and institutions, by molesting interests and expectations which already exist, for the purpose of creating new ambitions and exigencies, by inciting the passions of the people, by forcing individuals into a state of struggle or confusion, and society into a general convulsion. I will transmit the sceptre of Spain into the hands of the Queen, upon whom the law has conferred it, entire, without deterioration or detriment, in the same state as the law has conferred it upon her."

This was the manifesto of the Queen Regent to the nation immediately on entering upon the duties of her office. Her Majesty acted by the advice of Zea Bermudez, the minister of her deceased husband, who together with his colleagues were all confirmed in their respective offices ; and yet, with the levity with which facts are dealt with throughout the chapter on the Basque Provinces, it is stated, (p. 207) that "upon Ferdinand's death, men were restored to favour throughout the country, who had been notoriously hostile to their (the Basques) rights, and who had assisted in the scheme for their subversion during the Revolution of 1820. The language, too, of the Court and Ministers with

reference to the Basque privileges was not ambiguous, even in the first days of the Queen's accession."

Men were *not* restored to favour who had been hostile to the rights of the Provinces; and even if they had, we do not suppose that the entertaining of a particular opinion upon a generally disputed point, would be considered in any country a valid reason for excluding a man from a subordinate office in the State; or that his being appointed to one, would justify rebellion against the Crown. Lord Carnarvon may defend such a doctrine in print, and as applied to Spain, but we doubt his being prepared to uphold it in the Parliament of England.

"The language of the Court and the Ministers" was certainly "not ambiguous." It was the same as the language of the Manifesto; and we defy any attempt to put upon it a construction hostile to the Basque privileges. The policy of the Manifesto may be, and was at the time generally, called in question; but the Basques had no reason to complain of it. They could have found nothing in it but that which really was the truth, for the intention of the Queen Regent and her Government at that time was to make no changes whatever in the system which had obtained under the late King. The mortal remains of Ferdinand, however, had not yet been conveyed to the Escorial, when the Royalist Volunteers, who had complete possession of Biscay, (and it must not be forgotten,

that their occupation of the country was a direct violation of the privileges) proclaimed Don Carlos King, without any reference whatever to men restored to favour, or to the language of the Court or Ministers, or to an abolition of the fueros.

We perfectly agree with Lord Carnarvon (p. 226), "that it is more than questionable whether one party can recede from a compact of such a nature without the concurrence of the other—but the wildest partizan never maintained till now, that during the existence of the connexion one party is at liberty to absolve itself from the obligations it has incurred, and yet to require the other to fulfil its part of the contract." We will ask which of the two parties first receded from the compact? The Queen, who declared that she would make no change; or the Biscayans, who threw off their allegiance? The compact of the Biscayans was with the Sovereign of Spain; and in the event of a disputed succession, it behoved them at least to have remained neuter. But if they, not only before but against the rest of Spain, proclaimed Don Carlos the legitimate King, then they had no right to complain if the Queen had violated (which, however, she did not do) the compact. They at once made themselves partizans; and as far as in them laid, would have deprived the Queen of her throne; and they did so during the existence of the connexion, the validity of which they admitted when they subsequently complained that their

privileges were not observed. Their noble advocate has thus throughout his chapter placed himself precisely in the position described by himself, of that wild partizan who maintains that one side is at liberty to absolve itself from its obligations, and yet require the other to fulfil its part of the contract.

It is true that when the insurrection had assumed a formidable and decided character, Castanon, a wilful foolish man, who commanded a portion of the Queen's troops in the Provinces, put down the *fueros without any instructions direct or implied from the Government*. His act was reprobated in the strongest manner, and he was shortly afterwards removed from his command. The Government knew well that this man's folly would render a great service to the insurgents, by furnishing them with a pretext for rebellion, which up to that time they had wholly wanted ; a pretext which was sure to be seized upon by the real authors of the revolt, in order to excite those popular passions which were already embarked in the contest. It was one thing, however, to have wished that this folly (for after the rebellion of the Basques it was not injustice) should not have been committed, and another to disavow or endeavour to repair it. Those who know any thing of the Spanish, and more particularly of the Biscayan character, will admit that the Government would have gained absolutely nothing by offering to annul the act of Castanon,

and to restore the *fueros*. It would have been generally looked upon as a proof of weakness or fear ; it would therefore have angered the friends of the Queen, while it would have been rejected by the Basques, and the Government would have been despised by both parties. Such is the Spanish character. The mischief was done. Swords had previously been drawn, the scabbards were now flung away, and the wager by battle became the only issue by which the question could be tried.

No part of the “Romance” upon the Basque Provinces is further removed from reality than the episode about Don Carlos and the Council of State, (p. 264), in which the Infant is made to rise and state, “that the ministerial scheme (to abridge materially, if not entirely to suppress, the liberties of the Basques) involved a manifest breach of the compact solemnly entered into between the Crown of Spain and the people of the free Provinces—that the Crown was bound to respect the established rights of the meanest subject of the realm, &c. &c.”

A few words will suffice to bring the tale within the limits of reality, from which it has been carried. Ballesteros, who was Minister of Finance from 1824 to 1832, constantly endeavoured, for purposes of revenue, to carry forward to the frontier of France the custom-houses which are now established on the frontier of Castille. The King referred the whole subject to the Council of State, over which Don Carlos presided whenever the King was

absent. The Council reported, that *with reference to the general circumstances of the kingdom*, it would not be politic to make the proposed change. But the Infant produced no “electrical effect,” (p. 266), and he took no more part in the discussion, or the report upon the question, than did the other members of the Council.

That the story may have been recently manufactured for the use of the Basques, and that it may at this moment be current in Biscay, is very possible : but when Lord Carnarvon was told, that “the honourable part which Don Carlos had taken in the Council on a question of such vital interest to the Biscayans was quickly known in Biscay, and from that moment he became the undivided object of their enthusiasm—the centre of their hopes—the idol of their affections,” his credulity was practised upon.

If Don Carlos had proceeded, as his historian in this matter has reported, he would only, as we have shewn above, have been acting in the interest of despotism, and in conformity with the practice observed by the absolute monarchs of Spain. A despotic will could alone have maintained the privileges intact : for every thinking man had for years been of opinion that some modifications of them were necessary, whenever the proper time might arrive ; that is, that the Provinces should contribute more equally to the general burthens of the State—but that the mode of apportionment

should be left to themselves, as their system of internal administration is excellent: and this system, we repeat, as well as the municipal institutions of the Provinces, it has never been the intention of the Spanish Government since the King's death to alter.

In one word, the insurrection was commenced by the Royalist Volunteers of Biscay, who knew that their existence as a privileged corps depended upon the success of Don Carlos; it was assisted by the same corps in Castille, and by Santos Ladron, a bold man of bad character, who was desirous of revolution for revolution's sake, and for his own interest. It was urged on by the priests, who have an incredible influence upon the simple and ignorant mountaineers of Biscay. It has been supported by ex-officers of the army, by deserters from the Queen's ranks, and by men who had no interest in the Provinces. It has been called a war of dynasty, or principles, or privileges, or religion, as best suited the purposes of the moment; and it has lasted solely on account of the character of the country in which it has been carried on.

Under these circumstances we have no fear that any candid mind will share in Lord Carnarvon's "feelings of unmingled humiliation at the sullied honour" of England, in contemplating "our recent policy towards the Basques;" or that such a mind would not instantly detect the fallacy of the "precisely parallel case," stated by his Lordship.

“If,” says Lord Carnarvon, (p. 275) “at the period of the Union with Ireland, the English Government had endeavoured to carry that measure into effect without obtaining the consent of the Irish Parliament; if Ministers had decreed that the Irish Parliament should be considered as absolutely extinguished after a given day, but that Ireland might hereafter send to the English Legislature as many Deputies as the English Government in its wisdom might chuse to permit, offering at the same time the stern alternative of instant obedience or the sword; if such a crime against freedom and justice had been committed, I do not think ‘there breathes a man with soul so dead,’ or with so low an estimate of Irish spirit, as to suppose that peer, priest, and peasant would not have rallied round the standard of insurrection against an usurping Government,” &c. “Yet this policy, which would have been execrated by every good man in England, the Spanish Ministers have adopted towards the revolted Provinces,” &c.

The injustice of acting by Ireland as Lord Carnarvon hypothetically assumes, cannot be denied; and it would have been unpardonable in the Spanish Government, if sufficiently rich, not to have imitated the example of England, by “obtaining the consent of the Biscayan Legislature,” if the opportunity for so doing had arisen. But suppose that Ireland, in 1745, had declared itself in favour of the Pretender, and had made war

against the House of Hanover, and that the English Government had, in return, inflicted upon Ireland *all* the advantages of the British Constitution, does Lord Carnarvon imagine that those Irish, whom the new leader of the Tories has designated as a set of aliens, would have felt that a very great hardship had been inflicted upon them? Perhaps the Irish people would not even now be sorry if Lord Lyndhurst and his party would so reward their loyalty and good conduct. We cannot, however, but think the Noble Lord's allusion to Ireland is on this occasion singularly ill selected. That country is still fresh with the records of the bloody and tyrannical acts of English despotism; every acre of it has been forfeited three times over; its altars have been thrown down, its people have been trampled in the dust; yet its Kings were as independent, and the pages of its history abound with proofs of as glorious an attachment to freedom, as can be found in the annals of Biscay. And by whom was all this done? By England. And why? Because the independent condition of that integral part of the British dominions was thought to be anomalous; was said to be inconvenient; was pronounced incompatible with the general good. But England has resembled Castanon, she abused her power; and Ireland, in the language of the Biscayans of old, sternly said, "so far, no farther shalt thou go." England yielded to avoid a renewal of civil war; and will

have to yield still further, and with the same object.

We are quite sure that Lord Carnarvon is as he describes himself (p. 277) no heated or indiscriminating opponent, but we are totally at a loss to conceive how he has brought his mind to consider the policy of the British Government as directed against the privileges of the Basques: or how he has been able so to contract his views as to see nothing but a contest about the privileges of one twenty-sixth part of the population of Spain, in the great questions of a disputed title to the throne, and of a choice between despotic or representative Government, between the inquisition and national improvement. Nor can we explain how he, as a peer of the realm, and an hereditary legislator of his country, called upon by his position to decide upon the interests of England, could in any other spirit but that of partizanship gravely state, that the British Government is actuated by feelings of hostility towards the Basques, and is aiding the Queen of Spain in the suppression of their fueros, while he does not even glance at the enormous extent of British interests, and of European results which hang upon the issue of the Spanish question.

We are really almost ashamed of answering such a puerile objection, for it must be evident to every one that if British assistance is given to Spain, it must be afforded at the spot where the war is carried on, and against those who are making the

war, and they are Biscay and the Basques. If, as Lord Carnarvon says *passim* through his chapter, popular opinion is every where in favour of Don Carlos, then the British Legion in Biscay is making war generally against Carlism in Spain, the head-quarters of which are in the insurgent provinces. If Carlism is absolutely restricted to the Basque provinces, then half a million of inhabitants are endeavouring to give the law to thirteen millions, and the well-being of the Peninsula, and the tranquillity of Europe demand, that so monstrous an attempt should be stoutly resisted.

Had the noble Lord turned his powerful mind to these all-important considerations, had he well weighed the state of things which Englishmen should desire to see established in Spain, he would not have said (p. 279) that a British expedition had sailed from England under circumstances "uncongenial to a generous mind," he would not have considered that the persons who composed that expedition were animated by other than loyal and patriotic sentiments, he would "have sympathised in their fortunes," and have "wished for their success." England is now, as in those proud times to which Lord Carnarvon alludes, fighting to rescue a friendly nation from oppression and from slavery in its worst forms of bigotry and ignorance. England holds out her hand to help an ally to take that place among the nations of Europe to which she was destined by nature, and of which she has

been deprived by circumstances, from which a fortunate conjuncture of events now presents an opportunity for emancipation. England is endeavouring to promote that state of things most favourable to her own political and commercial interests; and if an Englishman has to quarrel with his Government for the part they have hitherto taken in Spain, it should be, not for what they have attempted, but for what they have left undone. Spain, which often before has been the battle-field of Europe, became so again upon the death of Ferdinand; the antagonist principles which now agitate the Continent, though as yet with smothered violence, were in presence of each other upon Spanish ground, and under circumstances the most important to the futurity of Europe. The mighty problem was to be solved whether it be possible for a nation to pass securely, and with advantage, from a despotic to a constitutional form of Government; whether a people, long and perseveringly kept in darkness, can bear the light of improvement, and whether men who, during a long course of years have been slaves, are fit for comparative freedom.

These questions were to be tried in Spain, and it may be unhesitatingly asserted that the prospects of a successful issue were great; for he would commit a vast error who supposed that Spain, during the ten years of the despotic reaction, which preceded the King's death, had stood still. Educa-

tion, notwithstanding the united influence of the Court and Church to crush it, had advanced, and no small portion of the rising generation had studied the political errors of their fathers, had resolved to take warning by them, and were well prepared even at the time of the King's death, to carry into effect a change from despotism to liberal institutions. There is as little doubt as can exist upon a matter now incapable of proof, that the experiment would have succeeded if it had had the fair trial which internal tranquillity would have afforded ; and had it succeeded, it requires but little reflection to perceive the important influence which the event must have exercised in Europe. That a nation, which for ages has been under the double yoke of a kingly and of a priestly despotism, with all the train of degradation and corruption which they bring with them, should emancipate itself, and gradually enter upon the enjoyment of those blessings which freedom of thought and liberty of action cannot fail to produce—that those sources of national wealth, which in Spain are more unexplored than in any other country of Europe, should be gradually developed—and that this great branch of the European family should become rich and prosperous, must have roused the attention of those countries which are still exposed to the evils of despotic Government. To England, who, though unjustly censured by some for what is mis-called her selfish policy, is the only really philan-

thropic country in the world, it would be no slight consideration that the autocrats of the Continent should be compelled to listen to the public opinion which would then spring up—that their will should no longer usurp the place of reason, and that the happiness of millions should increase with the enlightenment from which they could no longer be debarred.

We are far from advocating the cause of revolution any where. It is in general a disastrous means towards a most doubtful end, nor do we consider that England, whatever may be her wishes or her interests, has a right, or that it is her policy, to meddle unasked in the internal affairs of other countries; but she has a right to rejoice at, and it would not be her policy to prevent, that state of things which might bring absolute monarchs to a knowledge that popular rights have a real existence, and that the time is at last arrived when the happiness or misery of multitudes can no longer depend exclusively upon the caprice of one man. This may be sneered at as chimerical, or may be reprobated as revolutionary; but we would ask whether it would or would not be agreeable to us to see throughout Europe, life and property protected by an impartial administration of justice, industry free, and liberty really understood as they are in England? whether such a state of things would not be politically, commercially, and socially advantageous to us? If so—and no man in his senses

can deny such self-evident truths—then it must be admitted that the solemn duty of the British Government is to foster every circumstance favourable to such improvements, which may arise in the constantly varying course of political events.

The Spaniards, it may be said, are indisposed to change, and view with indifference any attempt at improvement, and to all appearance this is true : but their apparent indifference is the resignation which grows out of long habit, out of continued oppression, and out of the absence of hope. Where is now that chivalrous feeling which in days of yore placed the Spaniard without a rival in deeds of arms?—where is that spirit of enterprise, and that noble emulation which made him no less renowned in the wide field of art?—where is that Castillian honour for ages proverbial?

They are all buried in the ruins of that greatness to which they gave rise, and the Spanish people are now ground down, by misgovernment, to the lowest level of civilization. To satisfy their animal wants—to bask in the sun—to conceal their little savings from the rapacious grasp of the priest and the petty official tyrant of the village—is all that the common people in Spain have, for years past, ventured to aspire to. How can it be expected that a nation so reduced can fully understand the blessings of an order of things which is unknown to them, or devise adequate means for bettering their condition? Accordingly, they are passive. They submit to the

ills they have, rather than run the risk of those they know not of. But it would be absurd to suppose that they are unwilling to receive better things, that they would refuse instruction, or decline to be enlightened as to their own value, and their own position. And it is as much the duty of those who interest themselves in the progress of civilization, and of human happiness, to administer to these wants, though their full extent may not be known or felt, as it is their duty to provide for those of the feeble or the helpless.

Sooner or later this improvement must take place in Spain : that its progress may be difficult and slow is probable ; but that its ultimate success should be doubtful, none but those who are ignorant of Spanish history, for the last thirty years, could suppose. From Spain, then, the country most oppressed, and the lowest in the scale of the despotically governed people of Europe, will spring that general spirit of improvement, which even the present generation may hope to see spreading over Europe. The examples of England and France have but little weight ; the prosperity and liberal institutions of England are almost traditionary in their origin, and to imitate them is considered hopeless—those of France took their bloody rise in scenes too fresh in memory, and inspiring too just a horror, not to be looked upon as a price too dear, even for what they have contributed to produce.

But Spain is precisely in the position to attract the attention of all that portion of Europe which is

suffering from misgovernment. She is in a position analogous to such countries: if she can emerge from her adverse circumstances, and shake off her chains, and shew the world that she is free, an awful warning will be given to despotic sovereigns; and they will either have seriously to set about the work of reform, in order that it should not be undertaken by other means, or they will, at all events, have so much upon their hands at home, that the field of their ambition will be infinitely narrowed; external aggression will be little feared, and Europe will be more than ever secure in the enjoyment of the blessings of peace.

It is not to be supposed that these considerations were not fully weighed by the British Government, when it recommended to his Majesty at once to recognize Isabella II. Independently of the better right of the Queen, they must have well known that if Don Carlos succeeded to the throne, the system of Ferdinand would be *improved upon*—that political and priestly experiments would be made, which Ferdinand, in the plenitude of his power, was too sagacious to attempt—that the Holy Alliance would be all-powerful in the Peninsula; and that Russia would become as formidable to us at Lisbon, as at Constantinople. The English Government must have seen that the church party, which, in Spain as elsewhere, is incapable of reading the signs of the times, would seek to create a civil war, and could count among its ranks all those lovers of abuse

who, having thriven and battered in corruption, would dread the creation of a public opinion, and the many reforms to which such opinion would give rise. It was clear, therefore, that the Queen must reckon for support upon the liberal party—that some form of popular representation must be adopted—and that, by degrees, a confederation of constitutional governments in the West would be formed, to make head against the despotic confederation of the North and East of Europe: a common interest would bind together England, Belgium, France, Spain, and Portugal. A greater project never was formed by statesmen; and had the chances against its success been ten times greater than they were, it would have been worth the attempt. Under a better system, our commercial relations with Spain were likely to improve, and boundless means would have been afforded for profitably investing our surplus capital, which of late years has sought employment in every description of wild and distant speculation. In the event of a war, we should have had in Spain an ally, whose friendly ports and geographical position might be to us of inestimable value. Was the recognition, then, of the Queen, we ask, a matter of doubtful policy? were we, with adverse interests to theirs, to have adopted the course of the Holy Alliance? were we to have waited till the contest had begun, in order to see which side was the strongest; or to abide its issue, when our calculating selfishness would have com-

manded neither respect nor gratitude from either party? Most unquestionably not; and the King's Government, in recognizing the Queen, pursued the course most consistent with the dignity, and with the interests of England.

It is hardly necessary to enter into the details of the first six months of the war. It exhibited a succession of faults and mismanagement on the part of the Queen's Government: the faction was too much despised, and such means as were taken for its destruction were ill devised, and worse executed. Don Carlos still hovered upon the frontier of Portugal, fanning the hopes of the little party which had reared its head in his favour, but not daring to take part with his friends. He and Don Miguel mutually relied upon each other, and in both countries kept alive the flame of civil discord.

The Quadruple Treaty was signed, and was at once successful: the two Pretenders capitulated, without firing another shot. What was then the conduct of the British Government, and its agents in Portugal? That which becomes England towards fallen men. Don Miguel, at no small personal risk to the British officer who protected him, was conducted on board the British ship which was to bear him to the destination he himself had selected. Don Carlos was found by the Secretary of the English Legation, at Lisbon, in the most abject state to which man can be reduced by fear. "Save me from Rodil," was his only prayer, and his con-

stant cry. He *was* saved from Rodil, by British interference ; and he was conveyed, at his own request, to England, on board a man-of-war, with his family, and sixty persons whom he designated to form his suite. Nobly has he repaid our protection ! Well has the author of the Durango decree deserved the life and liberty he owes to British generosity !

Had the war in the North been then conducted with ordinary skill, it must have been terminated in six weeks ; but Rodil did little more by his operations than disgust his own troops, and organize those of the enemy, whom he taught confidence in themselves. The same results, though with variations in their causes, took place under his successors, and at each succeeding failure public opinion became irritated, and the Government became weaker. The political state of Spain during the last three years has been entirely regulated by the events of the war ; every change of Government has been occasioned by military failures ; the want of success in the war has engendered the revolutionary spirit of the liberal party, the secret societies, the popular tumults, and all the ills which revolution is heir to.

The Estatuto Real more than satisfied public expectation ; it was received with royal salutes and every demonstration of joy and respect by Catalonia and its Captain-General Llauder, the man who, but a few months before, had overthrown the

Government of Zea. The same took place in every other part of the country. Military failures forced the author of the Estatuto and his successors, each in their turn, to resign, and they will continue, so long as they last, to overthrow ministries and systems, one after the other. Disappointment, fear, and anger were the consequences, and these are malleable materials; upon these the revolutionists worked, and with these they created a spirit which did not previously exist, and which no other concurrence of events could have succeeded in producing. This spirit, far more than their own cause, gave the Carlists strength, for it produced disunion in the Queen's party; and thus on both sides the Government of the day was weakened. Intervention was asked for, not because the means for putting down the war were exhausted, but because those means had been misapplied, and because it was not known how to do better; and the Government moreover absolutely required the termination of the war in order to be strong enough to extinguish political differences;—a work which they would almost have been spared the trouble of executing the day that peace had been restored. If Spain had asked of her allies a good general instead of an army, it is possible that every object might have been attained; but intervention was refused. England and France would not believe that, with such abundant resources still at her command, it was necessary for Spain to submit to the anti-

national expedient of foreign bayonets, which it was considered should be kept as a last resource. It is possible that the British Government did consider, as Lord Carnarvon says, that the interests of England required, on our part, an active intervention in the affairs of Spain; and if so, they thought most rightly. But we would ask, if in the state of parties in the two Houses of Parliament, it would have been wise to moot the question even of the expense of sending 10,000 men to Spain? Was it likely that it would have been carried? and would the Government have served the cause which they considered so important in an European as well as in a British point of view, by going out upon the question, and by allowing the Tories to come into office pledged to a certain degree against the Queen of Spain? And yet the noble Lord says, then if you were not active you should have been neuter. Would this have been generous, or politic, or rational? Lord Carnarvon would have had us say to our ally,—you are in distress—you are worse off than you were when first we became your friends. Therefore, we will not only not give you the assistance you solicit, but we will turn our backs upon you into the bargain. Would not every one who had the feelings of an English gentleman, have cried, shame upon such a course? Would not the Tories have joined in the cry, and turned the degradation of the ministers into weapons against them? Would not the Holy Allies have triumphed

and exulted at what they would have considered the result of their intrigues and menaces at that time ?

The Juntas of 1835 were the consequence of non-intervention, and we may here remark, in passing, that Lord Carnarvon's knowledge, or memory, or candour, must have singularly forsaken him when he asserts (p. 292.) that we supported the Juntas of the provinces in which all the Jacobinism of Spain was concentrated. It is notorious that M. Mendizabal was appointed to a seat in the cabinet voluntarily by the Queen Regent, at the suggestion of her Prime Minister, and without any interference on the part of England, some months before the establishment of the Juntas. When he arrived the country was in a complete state of confusion, the authority of the Queen was nowhere acknowledged, execration of Toreno was the universal cry, and instead of M. Mendizabal being forced upon the Queen by the insurrection of the Juntas, as Lord Carnarvon says, her Majesty gladly availed herself of his arrival, and of the *prestige* which he brought with him, to appoint him her Prime Minister. In moments of revolutionary crisis, popular feelings, to be directed, must be attracted towards and concentrated in, either a name or a device. Of the truth of this, Spain twice afforded a proof in 1835. An obnoxious ministry and military failures caused the name of Mendizabal to be the focus to which the popular excitement was drawn ; in 1836 the

same causes made the Constitution become the rallying cry. In both instances the raging storm was appeased, and angry passions in each case yielded to the illusions of hope. Nor is this to be wondered at. The people sick of the war, and exhausted by the sacrifices which its duration imposed upon them, sought extraordinary means for extricating themselves from their suffering state; as a patient who has unsuccessfully submitted to all the known rules of art, catches in despair at any new remedy, with a hope of improvement, and with a conviction that he cannot be worse.

To return, however, from this digression. Direct intervention being refused, the Spanish Government, in order to make up for the defects of the national army, determined upon raising a corps of foreign troops. In England this might have been done without the express permission of the Government. It is true that a law existed which would have imposed difficulties in the way of such an undertaking; but it is idle to say that this law could not have been evaded. With money everything can be done, and at that time the Spanish Government was in comparatively flourishing circumstances. The expedition of Don Pedro was raised, equipped and embarked in England—almost it may be said in defiance of the Government, hardly with the necessary funds, and with little other support than the adventurous spirit which, at all times, has distinguished our countrymen. The

Government may check, but they cannot prevent this, more than any other kind of smuggling. Preventive laws never have and never will be successful against the interests of those who are determined to evade them.

The Government of Spain, however, chose the more becoming course, and applied to our own for permission to do according to law, that which they might have effected clandestinely. They asked for the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Bill. Upon what ground could the British Government refuse this act of service to an ally? The Foreign Enlistment Act was passed for a particular purpose to answer a political end. The motives which led to it had long ceased to exist. Where was the objection to suspend its operations when there was every reason to believe that to do so would be useful to the cause we wished well to, and when the effect would be to prevent Englishmen from violating an existing law?

Can it with truth and fairness be said that any motive of internal policy should have induced the Government to forbid a certain number of young men from seeking distinction and crosses, and from going in a time of general tranquillity to learn the art of war in a country where, from its nature, war must be carried on in a manner which calls upon the officer for the exertion of all his talents and acquirements? or why should a certain number of unemployed persons, of the lower classes, have been

prevented from gaining an honest livelihood for a year or two, subject to military discipline ? On the contrary, every argument, both foreign and domestic, was in favour of the measure, and the fact of a distinguished officer in the King's service having volunteered to place himself at the head of the expedition, was a matter of additional satisfaction to the Government. But, we deny with all the fervour of conviction, and all the right that common sense and candid argument can confer, that the suspension of the Enlistment Bill was injurious either to the national honour, or to the influence of England in Spain. We deny that the Government "shifted the responsibility from their own to other hands, and became unaccountable for the consequences of their own acts ;" and we take the words of Lord Carnarvon for the grounds of this denial, "for how can a Government be considered answerable for the conduct of an army, or the success of an expedition neither controlled by the eye of the executive, nor supported by the resources of the State?"—most unquestionably it cannot, and no right therefore exists of holding the Government to such a responsibility. Did the Government take any part in the enlistment of the Legion ? Did they then, or have they since, devoted any funds for its support ? did they either within or without the walls of Parliament ever announce that the Legion was under the control of the Government, or that they gave instructions to

its commander, or that they were responsible for his success or failure? What claim could they have to authority or control? Was the Legion paid or fed or clothed by England? In whose service did its officers hold rank, and under whose colours did they fight? Had they carried with them the standard of England then indeed it might have been said that they were British troops. But they are to all intents and purposes Spanish troops, and they are felt to be so in Spain both by Christinos and Carlists. Our Government is no more responsible for them than the French Government is for the Legion of Algiers, which went to Spain at the same time, and for the same purposes as the British, with this difference however, that it was already in the service of Louis Philippe, and was an integral part of the French army.

But Lord Carnarvon says (p. 282), that “under such an improvident system the national arms must be exposed to defeat—an English officer is placed under the immediate control of a foreign general.” Then is it not the height of absurdity to pretend that a certain body of Englishmen, having voluntarily consented to place themselves under the orders of a Foreign General, the British Government must be responsible for their acts, or that the national honour should be committed by the acts of a foreigner. That the English commander might be exposed to have “his most strenuous exertions and

best considered schemes thwarted by the jealousy or defeated by the folly of his superior," was notorious from all former experience. To what brutal jealousies, to what unaccountable follies was not the Duke of Wellington exposed? Were *his* exertions not thwarted? Was he not met at every turn by the jealousy of the Cortes, by the hatred of the Spanish generals, and by the spiteful defection of those upon whom for their own interests he had the best right to reckon? And did it not require all the energy and strength of mind, as well as the consummate skill of that extraordinary man, backed by all the power of England, to overcome those tremendous obstacles? And yet Lord Carnarvon might with just as much justice have said at that time as now, "are these the influences by which a British army should be surrounded?" "Is this a state to which a British officer should be reduced?" "Is this a position in which the King and country should be placed?" But if the Duke of Wellington, instead of triumphing over every description of enemies had met with reverses, and if those reverses had been clearly deducible from the misconduct of those who were nominally co-operating with him, we do not believe that Lord Carnarvon would have thought that the honour and influence of Great Britain had been consigned to improper hands, or that the national honour had been placed "out of the pale of constitutional law." These are the contingencies to which war is subject, these are the contingencies and

inconveniences of co-operation, they depend in a great measure upon the individual character of men, they can rarely be foreseen and still more rarely provided against—like other accidents of life they must be endured and made the best of.

His Majesty's Government then has only to answer for that most defensible act of policy—the suspension of the law which prohibits Englishmen from volunteering to serve a friendly Power; and if the Act of Parliament had been repealed instead of suspended, we should have been better pleased, and should not have feared for the Government the attacks of the Tories. At all events, in such a case, one of the most distinguished Tory leaders would have been forced to be dumb. The may-I-not-do-what-I-will-with-my-own principle, is here most undeniably applicable, and unless it was to be theoretically argued as well as practically proved, that there is one law for the rich and another for the poor, the right which a Duke has over his house and lands, may be claimed by his humbler countryman in behalf of his own person, and in the selection of honest means for supporting his existence.

Upon the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Bill, the Government should take their stand, and defy their opponents; there all connection with and control over the Legion on their part ceased. That they wished the Legion success is most true, and where is the British heart, not cankered by party or spirit warped in favour of despotism and ignor-

ance, that would not have taken a lively interest in a band of adventurous Britons engaging in a cause so closely connected with the political regeneration of Europe, and of which the battle-field is a land endeared to us by so many glorious associations?

We confess that the manner in which Lord Carnarvon has treated the question of the Durango decree, has occasioned us equal pain and surprise. His Lordship says, it is severe in principle and has been severe in its operation (p. 286)! Good God! is it possible that an English Nobleman of the most unsullied honour and of a virtuous and amiable character, should thus express himself upon the wholesale cold-blooded butchery, not only of his fellow-creatures, but of his fellow-countrymen. His Lordship does not consider that circumstances altogether "justified the amazement of the Government" on hearing of the execution of prisoners; and he even throws the shield of his approbation over the bloody edict, by declaring his opinion that Englishmen were excluded from the beneficial operation of the Eliot Convention, by the spirit of the agreement. It is with unaffected regret that we see such workings of party spirit upon a mind like Lord Carnarvon's.

"Protection," his Lordship says, "was pre-supposed"—most unquestionably it was. Why should the British Government have imputed to Don Carlos an intention of wholesale murder? What motives had they for believing that a Christian prince,

or that a civilized man should be guilty of an act now rarely committed, even by savage tribes? What an insult it would have been to suppose that a man who had the words of religion always flowing from his mouth, should have a heart so black and hardened, as deliberately to order prisoners to be put to death in cold blood. The horrid practice had been resorted to by the generals of both armies, but upon their own responsibility; no official sanction had been ever given to it; it had been looked upon as a measure of necessity, and on both sides passed over in silence by those whose position and power might have enabled them to check the infernal practice. But it was reserved for the Pretender to the Throne of Catholic Majesty, deliberately to place his royal signature to a decree which will brand his name with infamy, and will trace his character in lines of blood: and this after a convention signed by his own personal sanction and authority, and by which this practice was formally abandoned. Yet Don Carlos has kindly feelings and some amiable qualities, but he has that which dooms princes to be the curse of those whom ill fortune places under their sway—he is to the most supreme degree weak and fanatical. The decree of Durango, for which he is morally responsible, is the work of the blood-thirsty priests by whom he is despotically governed, and in it we read the future history of Spain should Don Carlos ever ascend the throne. From the advisers of that edict would spring the

re-establishment of the inquisition and the gallows in every town, and the hand which was compelled to sign the Durango decree would with equal submission issue warrants to the hangmen and orders for autos de fé.

Yet Lord Carnarvon charges the Government with inconsiderate haste in disbelieving the incredible decree of Don Carlos, and thinking that a man, who but a few months before owed his life to English generosity, could not have determined upon butchering Englishmen in return. The Government may in this instance have thought too charitably of Don Carlos—nobody will fall into that error again.

The arguments put forth by Lord Carnarvon in defence of the edict, are as shallow as the tone he adopts is extraordinary upon this sad subject. His Lordship blames the government for the words in which he supposes them to address Don Carlos. "You shall extend to troops supplied with arms, ammunition and equipments from the stores and arsenals of a foreign country, in short, to a force in all respects essentially foreign as to a part of the Spanish army, that protection which in their natural character of British subjects they could have no right to expect under the peculiar circumstances of a war in which slaughter is the rule, and mercy the exception." Now, on this we have to remark, that before the Legion was raised, the Eliot Convention had abolished this rule, and had established the exception in its place; but will any man assert,

that British subjects, in their natural character, have no right to expect mercy in war? If we had declared war upon Don Carlos, and had sent troops to Spain, would not British subjects have been then in their natural character? and does a British peer proclaim his opinion that for that they are to be shot like dogs? But if their character was not that of British subjects, it was that of Spanish soldiers, and as such, they were, by Lord Carnarvon's own admission, entitled to the benefits of the treaty. That their arms and ammunition came from a foreign country cannot alter the question one iota, for otherwise the argument would apply equally to the Spanish soldiers who may have been equipped from the stores of England under the Quadruple Treaty, and would, on the other side, equally apply to the Carlist troops, who are so plentifully furnished with arms and munitions of war from France, and thus the application of the Convention would become impossible: but such an argument is too puerile for serious refutation. It is not true, we again repeat, that at the time the Legion left England, slaughter was the rule and mercy was the exception—the reverse was the case. The Eliot treaty had brought about the blessed change, and to the honour of both belligerents be it said, that convention was religiously observed. It is true that Zumalacarregui proposed that in case of the extension of the civil war beyond the limits of Navarre and the three provinces, the convention

should have equal force in other parts of Spain. It is equally true that the proposition was refused, and with reference to the very motives which caused the proposition to be made. There appeared at that time not the smallest prospect of the war being extended beyond the limits in which it was then confined, but a formal admission of the probability of such an extension, made by the government of the Queen in a solemn convention, would have given prodigious moral force to the Carlists, and would have equally dismayed the partizans of the Queen. This was the reason why the proposal was made, and why it was refused. To have agreed to it would have been at that time a suicidal act on the part of the Spanish government. There would have been no immediate benefits on the side of mercy, but moral advantages would have been given to the Carlists, of which they well knew the value. Besides, within the limits to which the treaty was confined, its operation was practicable. Two armies were there in presence of each other, engaged in almost daily combats, and every man made prisoner in arms throughout the provinces, was a *bona fide* belligerent. But who was to determine what was to constitute extension of the war to other parts of Spain? and how was it to be decided when and in what manner the convention was to become applicable in other provinces? The mere fact of such amplitude being given to it, would have been sufficient to call into activity detached

bands of "facciosos," who would reckon upon the impunity which would thus have been stipulated for their crimes: every robber upon the high road would have taken a purse or cut a throat in the name of Charles V., and if taken, would have claimed protection under the treaty, and if the ordinary law of the land had been carried into execution against them, some officer of the Queen's army would have died in retaliation for the spilling of a robber's blood. The operation of the treaty, then, was necessarily confined to the armies carrying on the war in Biscay and Navarre at that particular time. "Los mismos esercitos actualmente beligerantes en las Provincias Vascongadas y en el Reino de Navarra." But what does this mean? the identical men who composed those armies at that particular moment, or the men who might from time to time be serving in the armies acting in that particular theatre of war? If the former, every recruit who was received on either side after the signature of the convention, was manifestly excluded from its benefits, which is absurd. If the latter, then the Legion, which was within the tract prescribed, had every right, as part of one of the belligerent armies, to be included both in the spirit and letter of the treaty. To find it gravely asserted by Lord Carnarvon that public opinion in Biscay was sensibly alive to the distinction drawn by Don Carlos, and that the Basques submitted to a departure from their "*old enactment*," which proclaims

death against every invader of the soil (p. 287), can only cause a smile on the part of all who are aware how little those poor people knew or even thought about the matter, and what were the motives, and who the advisers, of Don Carlos to commit an act which caused the British government most properly to send out instructions to exclude him from the benefit of that "general protection which is seldom refused to the basest felon," (p. 344). What the protection is which British men-of-war and the British government are in the habit of affording to felons, we really know not; but we imagine, that if any description of felony merits to be excluded from British protection, it is that which has been committed by the pretender to the crown of Spain. Had Lord Carnarvon omitted his episode upon the Durango decree, his general argument would not have suffered—his impartiality would have been less impeachable—and his patriotism would have stood incomparably higher.

Far be it from the author of these remarks to imitate this example of Lord Carnarvon, or to speak of the murder of Cabrera's mother in terms other than those of unmitigated disgust and horror. It was a crime, and what has epigrammatically been called worse than a crime—a fault; in itself an act of brutal ferocity, by its consequences it did incalculable prejudice to the cause which its perpetrators pretended to serve. The ends of justice and humanity undoubtedly required that those persons should have

met with a punishment which to them would have been more severe than that universal obloquy which must ever attach to their names. But when Lord Carnarvon asserts that the circumstances which followed the murder of this unfortunate woman prove the decline of British influence in Spain, he asserts that with respect to which he proves himself ignorant.

By the dispatches laid before Parliament we have seen that immediately upon the intelligence of the event reaching Madrid, the British minister, without waiting for instructions from home, but on his own responsibility, and in the name of his government, addressed the Spanish ministers in becoming language, and told them they must be considered participators in the guilt if the perpetrators of the crime were not punished. The answer of the Spanish government was such as might be expected. No official details of the event were known at Madrid—but the fact of Cabrera's mother having been executed by Noguerras was notorious. Noguerras was accordingly removed from his command and ordered to proceed to Valencia to be tried for the offence, and the representations in his favour from the province where he commanded, and where his zeal and activity had made him the terror of the insurgents, were not listened to, although the government were without an officer of equal ability to replace him. Thus far it seems, that there was neither insult in offering, nor degra-

dation in accepting this satisfaction. But a short time elapsed before it became known that Mina was the more guilty and responsible of the two. The reprobation of his conduct was in like manner insisted upon—the same willingness, but not the same power existed in the Spanish government. Mina had then lately arrived in Catalonia, but he had already rendered important services both in re-establishing tranquillity, and in dispersing the Carlist hordes which had increased during the reign of the Juntas. The province was in all the excitement of hope, as to the benefits to be derived from his government, and he himself was at the zenith of popularity and power. Can it then be wondered at that the Spanish government should have felt a difficulty in disgracing a man who held such a position, or that they should have frankly declared that although the crime inspired them with horror, and though they were anxious for its punishment, yet Mina was beyond their reach—that if they attempted to dispossess him of his command, he would either himself not obey, or the people would force him into open revolt. This was no juggling excuse, but was known and admitted to be valid by all who were acquainted with the state of things at that time in Catalonia. It must be remarked too, that public opinion was by no means strongly pronounced against the execution of Cabrera's mother. Unfortunately, in Spain such events produce little of the horror which they else-

where inspire, and in this instance, and particularly in Catalonia, the act was considered one of mere retaliation for the innumerable atrocities committed by Cabrera, than whom a more fiendish monster never drew the breath of life—who for the last two years has wallowed in blood, who has with his own hands dashed out the brains of his captives, and whose boast it is, that mercy and compunction are alike unknown to him. And yet the acts of this monster are almost palliated by Lord Carnarvon, whose virtuous indignation is solely reserved for the partizans of the Queen!

The public then was in favour of Mina, and the Government dared not disgrace him; but they addressed him in such terms upon his conduct, that he sent in his resignation. The Government knew that if they had accepted it, all Catalonia would have risen against them; and what means of resistance had they, feeble, tottering, and surrounded by difficulties as they were. Mina's resignation was not accepted, the reasons were frankly laid before the British Parliament, and British influence failed, not on account of its decline in Spain, but because the authority, upon which alone it could be brought to bear, was itself powerless.

It has been argued, and in happy civilized England, men may have been disposed to think so, that this was the moment for us to have withdrawn our assistance, not only as a just chastisement of this system of horrors, but in order that the faintest suspicion

of having given them encouragement should not be laid to our charge. But our own experience, and the examples of history teach us that great political objects, are not to be lightly abandoned in resentment for the faults of those who may be acting with us, and that we must not measure the humanity and civilization of other nations by the standard of our own. Would to God that this were otherwise, but we must take and deal with mankind as we find them.

What in fact can abstractedly be more repugnant to the feelings of the christian and philosopher, than the practice of war, or that one nation should spill its blood and exhaust its resources against another, for some object which, if attained, is often unworthy of the sacrifices it has occasioned. Yet society sets aside the remonstrances of both the christian and the philosopher, and reckons those pages of history most glorious which tell the most of deeds of arms, and of blood.

Such cruelties as are perpetrating now in Spain, are abhorrent to British natures, but are we acquainted with them now for the first time? During the Peninsular war, what was the universal system of our allies from one end of the country to the other, but one of unmitigated cruelty? Was not the assassination of every straggling Frenchman that could be met with, a matter of individual boast to the Spaniard who had slain him? Were not prisoners of war, even after capitu-

lation, butchered without mercy by the guerillas? Were not convoys of wounded, of women and children, waylaid and massacred? Was not hospitality frequently offered, in order to allure the unwary victim to his doom? Were not French soldiers roasted alive by the Spanish peasantry? Did not in short a system prevail, at which the heart sickens, and which memory shrinks from recording? and where at that time was "the influence of England," which was to prevent such dreadful things? Did the General who commanded the British army refuse to co-operate with the Spanish troops on this account? Did the Minister who then conducted the affairs of the country, on that account withdraw the British army from Spain. Did they say to the Spanish government in the language of Lord Carnarvon:—"We will not disgrace ourselves by becoming accomplices in your acts of massacre, nor will we assist you to disgrace yourselves. We will not brutalize our troops by familiarity, not with war, but with murder. The treaty binds us to furnish you with arms for the prosecution of legitimate war, not for the execrable purposes to which you have applied them. You shall have no stores from our arsenals—you shall have no men from our islands, until you have adopted the usages of civilized nations, and have abandoned practices shameful to the country which acknowledges you, and to the age in which we live."

Such language would have found little echo at

home, and it would have very much rejoiced our enemies abroad; and the British Government of that day saw ample reason for not employing it. The present advisers of his Majesty have, probably, upon similar grounds, pursued a similar course.

We come now to the second of the two proofs put forward by Lord Carnarvon, as evidence of the utter failure of British influence at Madrid. The case, namely, of Mr. Honan. Mr. Honan was, we believe, for nearly two years the correspondent of the *Morning Herald* at Madrid, where he was noted for his Carlist predilections, and the marvellous difference which existed between facts as they occurred and as they appeared in his printed correspondence. This excited but little attention, either on the part of the Government or of the public. He was looked upon as one of the herd of misreporters of passing events in Spain, and as merely engaged in the exercise of his calling. "He warned his countrymen against speculating in Spanish funds;" and who would not have done so, independently of any desire to disserve the cause of the Queen? Who would not have dissuaded Englishmen from staking their capital on the contingencies of a civil war, and on the results of a disputed succession? But if Mr. Honan assumes that he was sent away from Madrid, or singled out from among his fellow-labourers as a victim for oppression, it can only be in order to give to himself and his writings an importance in England which assuredly they never had in Spain.

We shall state that which is known in London from having been notorious in Madrid, and which we have reason to believe Mr. Honan will not find it easy to contradict.

In the summer of 1835, Mr. Honan left Madrid, having been appointed representative of the *Morning Herald* at the Congress of Sovereigns at Tœplitz. His dispatches from that place were published, and though they certainly had more reference to the crowded state of the inns, and to the costumes of the visitors, than to the political objects for which so many great people had met together; yet we doubt not that Mr. Honan fulfilled his mission to the satisfaction of his superiors. He was then hurried off to another post, the court of Onate, from which he gave the British public the benefit of his observations, and of certain prophecies, the fulfilment of which is yet in the womb of time. In this instance he dropped the anonymous character he had adopted at Tœplitz, and his dispatches from Biscay were signed with all his names.

Having established the necessary relations, and done all that he intended in the insurgent provinces, he was then re-appointed to Madrid. After some delay, he proceeded to his post by the way of Barcelona, and by roads (if we are rightly informed) by which none but a Carlist traveller could have passed. At Barcelona, the police refused to endorse his passport for the capital, in consequence of orders which they had received from thence. Mr. Honan took no warning from this

pretty intelligible hint, but returned to France, and, by the way of Oleron, came to Madrid, to the no small surprise of his old friends, as they all gave him to understand. He called upon the British Minister, in order to give the explanations which he himself felt to be necessary. He is said to have stated that he had returned to Madrid against his will, and in spite of his having represented to the proprietors of his paper the personal danger he should incur, and the political impropriety he should commit by going to Madrid in a moment of great popular excitement, and when his opinions and his correspondence from the Basque Provinces were publicly known. But the answer to these appeals being, that if he did not immediately obey, he should lose his employment, Mr. Honan no longer hesitated—that is, he undertook to do what he believed would be dangerous to himself, and what he felt the Spanish Government ought not to permit. The Spanish Government had proved that they were of the same opinion when they refused to allow him to proceed from Barcelona to Madrid.

Mr. Villiers, we have heard, frankly told Mr. Honan that, under all the circumstances connected with his journey to Madrid, he could only look upon him as a Carlist agent, and that he, accordingly, should not allow him the privilege of forwarding his correspondence to England by the courier of the mission. Mr. Honan had not been many hours at Madrid before the Prime Minister

informed Mr. Villiers that the civil Governor of Madrid had reported to the Government that Mr. Honan's arrival had produced great excitement—that he was generally believed to be an emissary from the Pretender, and that in the event of any tumult his life would be in danger. Under these circumstances, and to prevent a disaster from which the utmost vigilance of the authorities might have failed to protect Mr. Honan, the Minister said that the Government proposed to send him away by Cadiz or by the frontier of Portugal. It is obvious that Mr. Villiers could not contest the right of the Government, but he is known to have stipulated that Mr. Honan should be allowed to take his own time for departure, and to choose his own road, which was readily assented to by the Spanish Government. Mr. Villiers communicated this to Mr. Honan, who replied, that he should only leave Madrid if compelled by force to do so. Whether it was owing to the press of more important business, or to that spirit of delay which is inseparable from Spaniards, we know not; but some six or seven-and-twenty days elapsed without any notice being taken of Mr. Honan, when he was suddenly waited upon by an officer of the police, and conveyed to the frontier.

These, we believe, are the precise circumstances of the case, detailed perhaps at tedious length; but the misstatements put forth by the press upon the subject not having been answered, it becomes

necessary to take some notice of them when they find their way into a work of which Lord Carnarvon is the author.

Now, with entire confidence as to the result, we appeal to the candour of the Noble Lord whether this was a case for the legitimate use of British influence. Could a British minister, remembering our own alien laws, and the arbitrary and often harsh manner in which they were executed during the war, could a British minister claim any right to prevent the Spanish Government from taking a measure with respect to a foreigner which they considered indispensable for state purposes, both as regarded the probable calling of the individual in question, and the consequences, political and personal, which were to be apprehended from his longer continuance at Madrid? Would a British minister have been justified in demanding from the Spanish Government that which he knew *mutatis mutandis* would have been refused by his own? If he had the power to enforce compliance with such a demand would it not have been ungenerous so to have employed that power? Would it have been consistent with that aid and support which it was his duty to afford to the Government of the Queen? Could Mr. Villiers have denied that he entertained the same opinion as the Spanish Government of Mr. Honan? With what justice then could he have thrown over that gentleman the shield of official protection, and what would be the limit of

such protection towards British subjects under similar circumstances, if an individual doing deliberately that of which he himself had admitted the impropriety, were to be thus held harmless?

We will put an analogous case. Suppose that in the year 1745, a Spaniard who had long been resident in London, and had been marked out by his enmity to the House of Hanover, had thought fit to join the Pretender in the Highlands of Scotland, and from thence to write letters signed with his name, calling Charles Edward king, and assuring the world that His Majesty was beloved by his people, and would shortly occupy the throne of England; and suppose that this foreigner had returned from the Highlands to London, under circumstances of great suspicion, and had declared that nothing but force should divert him from the purpose for which he came—We ask what would have been the conduct of the Government upon that occasion? Would they have given him the choice of Dover or Falmouth for leaving the kingdom, or would they have sent him upon a much longer and less optional journey? And what would have been said of and to the Spanish Ambassador, if he had insisted upon his countryman's right to remain in London?

Enough, however, of Mr. Honan; but we must add one word upon the decline of English influence in Spain, with which subject that gentleman's name has been so strangely connected: and we re-

gret that Lord Carnarvon should have made such a statement without due inquiry. If he had taken that trouble he would have learned that which we doubt not must give him sincere pleasure, namely, that English influence never was greater, and never was more productive of benefits to English interests than it has been during the last three years. The Noble Lord may or may not know that since the year 1817 every succeeding Government of England has remonstrated in vain against the flagrant infractions by Spain of the treaty for the suppression of the Slave Trade—that those remonstrances were treated with neglect and contempt, and that the horrible traffic was never more protected by the Spanish authorities, or carried on with greater facility than at the time of Ferdinand's demise. But in 1835 this abuse received its death-blow, by the signature of a treaty with England—the desireableness of which from its stipulations, and the hopelessness of obtaining it, had equally been acknowledged for many years. By this treaty the connivance of Spanish authorities in the Havannah and other places is checked, and the prevention of the Spanish slave-trade is placed wholly within the means of England. The Negro race may indeed bless the influence of Great Britain in Spain.

The British Mission at Madrid had during many years been unceasingly but unavailingly occupied in remonstrating against the piratical acts of the Coast Guard cruisers upon British merchant-ves-

sels ; the remonstrances were seldom attended to, and redress was never obtained. But the seizure of a British vessel by a Guarda Costa has, during the last two years, been as unusual as it was formerly of frequent occurrence.

Our countrymen in Spain had for years been exposed to the payment of extraordinary taxes, in violation of existing treaties; an abuse for which no redress could be obtained. To what extent British influence has been successful in getting rid of this grievance is sufficiently shewn by the letter to Mr. Villiers lately published in the Morning Chronicle, from the British merchants at Cadiz, (and by similar ones from the merchants of Malaga, Valencia, Alicante, and Tarragona,) thanking him for his exertions in preventing them from being compelled to contribute to a forced loan, and assuring him that they have "on numerous occasions" experienced the good effects of his advocacy of the rights of British subjects.* These and many other facts which might be named would, we suspect, be looked upon by all those knowing any thing about Spain, or really caring for British interests in that country, as more than a set-off for the retention of General Mina, or the removal of Mr. Honan.

Again, can it be supposed that during the last twelvemonth British influence has been idle or ineffective with regard to the recognition by Spain

* See Morning Chronicle, Jan. 4.

of the independence of the American States, that all-important question which has now been so happily terminated?

In fine, we can assure his Lordship, that if he were now to travel through nine-tenths of the provinces of Spain he would speedily discover the advantages of being an Englishman; whether in consequence of, or in spite of, the part our Government has taken in Spanish affairs, we leave our impartial readers to decide. In the midst of universal disorder the character of a British subject would be unto him as a talisman, and he would every where find himself revered and protected. Ill treatment he might doubtless meet with from detached bands of Carlists—but an Austrian or a Russian, notwithstanding the assurances they might give of the neutrality of their Government, would be left just as naked and penniless by the wayside as Lord Carnarvon may have ever been; and it is well known at Madrid, that whenever a Spaniard desires to travel in his own country with peculiar security, his first wish is to endeavour to provide himself with a passport from the British Minister.

We are quite sure that if it had occurred to Lord Carnarvon to make enquiry upon those matters of public notoriety, he would have abstained from declaring that our influence has utterly declined at Madrid, and that we are “hopelessly compromised” with the mass of the Spanish nation.

As regards the church, we are far from asserting

that the best system has been pursued, or that it has been carried into effect in the best manner, but the position of the government was one of extreme difficulty upon this subject, in consequence of the conduct of the church itself. The original intentions of the government were most clearly set forth in the manifesto of the Queen Regent; and the Pope's Nuncio in Spain, with a clear perception of the interests of Rome, urged the Pope immediately to recognize the Queen. His Holiness would, in all probability, have done so had he been a free agent; but he dared not disobey the mandates of Austria. He accordingly refused to invest the Nuncio with the political attributes of Ambassador, but directed him to claim the exercise of his spiritual functions.

To this degradation the Queen's government most properly refused to submit. They said, we will not have at Madrid an emissary from the Pope in an unusual and anomalous character, which will at once announce that our sovereign does not, according to the See of Rome, lawfully occupy the throne; and at the same time assert his spiritual supremacy, which would be a cloak for propagating his political opinions among the clergy of Spain.

The Nuncio was, therefore, not recognised; but the opinion of the Pope had naturally great weight with the clergy, who considered that in espousing the Pretender's cause, they should best serve Rome and themselves. Had they not pursued this course

of hostility to the Queen they never would have been molested by the Government, who had the most decided interest in conciliating them.

These observations, however, apply less to the secular clergy, who, as a body, were far from imitating the example of the Pope. Among them are numbered many friends of moderate liberal institutions, and some of the most decided and vigorous supporters of the present order of things. Many of this, in Spain, useful and exemplary class have considered it their duty to abstain from mixing in political discussions, and have continued to discharge their sacred functions without reference to the state of parties, and ignorant who was either minister or king. A large portion, however, of the secular clergy in Spain we believe to be friendly to Don Carlos, and, generally speaking, they have not fared worse than other classes from the vicissitudes of civil war.

But as to the whole of the regular clergy, there never has been a question. In the accession of the Queen they foresaw their own doom: in the success of Don Carlos, their security, and what is more, a continuance of that power and dominion which they have so long exercised in the Peninsula.

The Spanish monk is generally an illiberal and most illiterate person, of coarse manners, and not of a moral life, but he is well versed in low intrigues, in the management of the ignorant peasants about his convent, and in the conduct of most worldly

interests: cunning, patient, persevering, bigoted, accessible to all and having access to every body—and by means of the confessional, of spies, of gossip, and by perpetually mixing himself up with the family affairs of his neighbour, he becomes most thoroughly well informed of what is going on. To these qualities another and most essential one is to be added—faith in the cause. There is not a monk in Spain who had not, from the first moment, the most perfect confidence in the success of “The King his Senor,” and who has not been in some way or other employed in endeavouring to effect it.

An army of such men, in a country like Spain, is sufficient to overturn an empire. The Government did not “alienate” them, as Lord Carnarvon (p. 316) would have us to believe—but they bore with them for nearly two years, in spite of the assistance to Don Carlos and the protection to his partizans which they gave, and neither of which they were ever at much pains to disguise. Without admitting a tithe of the advantages attributed by Lord Carnarvon (pp. 316 and 317) to the convents, we do see cause to regret their abolition; but the Government were compelled, by a feeling of self-preservation, to resort to the measure, not being very well able to do away with the monks without abolishing the convents. In some instances it has been carried into effect with harshness—and the property has in general been turned to bad account; but the people have looked calmly on at the work

of abolition, and no popular commotion in favour of the monks has ever taken place, though it would often have been practicable if the disposition had existed. We believe, moreover, that Don Carlos would now find it no easy task to re-establish the convents, or rather, to re-establish their senorial rights and tithes and dues.

With the same apathy have the people beheld the removal of the bells and precious objects from their churches; and we are inclined to wish that such measures of the Government *had* met with resistance, for this apathy is a mark of the decline of religious feeling, which we consider the most, we would perhaps say the only, alarming feature in the futurity of Spain; for we fear it cannot be denied that although the outward show has been sustained, the really religious feelings which used to distinguish the Spanish nation have for years past been wearing away.

We come now, with Lord Carnarvon, to review the conduct of the Spanish Government, and the principles upon which the civil war has been conducted, and we do so in no spirit of partizanship, but solely animated with a desire that the truth on both sides should be known—that nothing should be extenuated, but naught set down in malice.

We commence by observing that Lord Carnarvon is incorrect when he states that the formation of the first powerful guerrilla in the Carlist interest was principally produced by the execution of

Santos Ladron, "in direct breach of a promise given to the inhabitants of Pampeluna that his life would be respected." Santos Ladron commanded a corps of 800 men, which he organized immediately upon the King's death ; he was routed by the Queen's troops, and he himself, a rebel leader taken in arms against his Sovereign, was ordered to be shot. The execution was deferred upon his declaring that he had some important communications to make, and he was carried to Pampeluna, but no promise that his life should be spared was ever given to the people of that place, who, on the contrary, clamoured loudly for his blood ; and the commanding officers of the garrison informed the Captain General that if he assumed the right which he did not possess, of delaying the execution of Santos Ladron, they would not answer for the subordination of their troops or for the tranquillity of the town. No government would have hesitated to execute a rebel under such circumstances, but so far from taking other measures of severity, the government of the Queen proclaimed an amnesty to all those who would lay down their arms and apply for pardon within a certain time. In December 1833, this time was extended to twenty days, and the clergy throughout the kingdom were required to exhort their flocks to loyalty and submission. This system was repeatedly tried, and always resorted to by every General of the Queen upon assuming the command of the army, but

without effect; the insurgents rarely presented themselves to claim the Queen's pardon, and those who did, never failed after a short time to return to their former companions.

The war, like every thing in Spain which involves strife, was carried on savagely, but the feelings on both sides did not reach to exasperation until after the season of lent in 1835, when the priests every where, but particularly in the northern provinces, taking advantage of the people coming to confession, stimulated the spirit of disaffection. In the month of March in that year, a party of one hundred and sixteen Christinos surrendered to nine hundred insurgents upon promise of quarter. They were, however, stripped entirely naked, and after having been marched eight leagues in that condition, the whole of them were butchered. The war from that time bore a character of ferocious exasperation which it had not till then assumed. Commanding officers appeared to vie with each other in inventing decrees of severity. The country was desolated by exactions; no quarter was given in the field; and the rural population being hostile to the Queen's troops, the insurgents had the most frequent opportunities of making reprisals and of exercising cruelty. Decrees of death were issued by the Carlists against every postmaster who should furnish horses to travellers or couriers, and the same fate awaited all fathers of families who did not present at the head-quarters of the

Carlist General, such of their sons as were capable of bearing arms.

We have said that the war soon bore the character of exasperation, but the sanguinary passions and deadly thirst for revenge which are inherent in Spanish blood, rendered it one of extermination on both sides. To control the blind fury of the troops was equally out of the power of the respective commanders, for he who had first cried, Hold enough, would probably have been branded as a traitor and have fallen a victim to his own humanity. The commanders on both sides were equally to blame, and both sides had the same sad excuse; but the Carlists had for the reasons above stated, more frequent opportunities of wreaking their vengeance upon their enemies than the Christinos, and those opportunities were never allowed to escape.

Upon one occasion the march of Zumalacarregui was impeded by a large number of prisoners he carried with him, and he ordered them all to be shot. It was represented to him that the report of the musketry might indicate the position of the Carlists to the enemy. Then let them be bayoneted, was the reply of this "extraordinary man, who," according to Lord Carnarvon, "combined with great military talents some of the most *chivalrous* and *winning* qualities of our nature;" and bayoneted the unfortunate wretches were. This "winning" anecdote is admitted by Mr. Henningsen, the enthusiastic panegyrist of the Carlist Chief, and from

it we may form some estimate of what the "chivalrous" nature of Zumalacarregui must have been. His great military talents were much upon a par with his mildness. He was a man well fitted for command in the Basque Provinces, where the nature of the country, the spirit of the population, and the mode of warfare, gave him immense advantages; but that does not necessarily imply great military talents, as is proved by the fact that ex-Lieutenants of the Royal Guards, priests, and peasants have risen to high command in the Carlist army, not from their talents, but from the extreme facility of being successful in the sort of warfare carried on in that mountainous country. A governor of Gibraltar with a well disciplined garrison and an ample supply of provisions, might defend that fortress for an unlimited time against any force that might be brought against it; and he would have the credit of bravery and perseverance, and of making the proper use of the means at his disposal; but it would not necessarily follow that he had great military talents, or that he might not be inferior in that respect to the commander of the troops he had been able from his fortress to despise.

Zumalacarregui was during many years the Colonel of a Spanish regiment of the line, in which capacity he had only made himself remarkable for the extreme severity of the discipline which he maintained. Having been maltreated by Quesada,

he deserted from the Queen's ranks and joined the standard of Don Carlos. In the Basque Provinces his talents for organization rendered him eminently useful to the cause which he had espoused ; the obedient spirit of the natives made it easy for him to enforce his principles of discipline, and he was soon enabled to embody the peasantry and to fit them for the guerrilla system of warfare which he proposed to pursue. In this system, and in the means for carrying it into effect, he followed in all its details the system of Mina during the Peninsular War—that, namely, of waiting for advantageous opportunities to attack detached corps, of cutting off supplies, interrupting communications, harassing the enemy, and exhausting his resources, by the many different methods which are practicable in a mountainous country and with a friendly population. This was the only system which offered to him a chance of success, and he knew his own countrymen sufficiently well to foresee the weakness which disunion would produce among the partizans of the Queen, if he could only contrive to protract the war. Without any wish to detract from the merit or to disparage the talent of Zumalacarregui we affirm, first, that with greater means at his command than Mina possessed, he did not carry the system of Mina into effect as completely as Mina himself had done ; and next, that any man with firmness of character and with a fixed resolution not to depart from the plan he had laid down,

would have been able to produce the same results as Zumalacarregui and by the same means, for these means are absolutely pointed out by the nature of the country and the habits of the people. None other could be resorted to, for none other would have a chance of success, and the proof of this is to be seen in the fact that every successor of Zumalacarregui has followed in his steps, and the interests of Don Carlos in as far as they are connected with the war, suffered nothing by the death of that chief.

So far from the “winning” and “chivalrous” character of Zumalacarregui having displayed itself in the insurgent provinces, it is notorious to all who know anything about the war, that he was distinguished for his despotic severity towards his soldiers, for cruelty often wanton and uncalled for towards the people, and by the most profound and undisguised contempt for his Prince. Don Carlos seldom was made acquainted with the direction in which he was to move, until he learned it by Zumalacarregui’s order of the day. In numerous intercepted dispatches of this chief to his officers, directions have been found to convey *the King and the baggage* to such and such a place; *to take no notice of such and such orders given by the King*; *to move in certain directions notwithstanding the orders of the King to the contrary, &c. &c.* It is hardly necessary to add, that Zumalacarregui was never disobeyed. Upon one occasion he broke up Don Carlos’s levee and took away all his officers,

saying he should not waste his time upon such masquerades, and he never missed an opportunity of bringing his Prince into contempt, which, whether it may satisfy or not Lord Carnarvon's notions of "chivalry," is exceedingly inconsistent with the old Castillian interpretation of that word.

We have no means of ascertaining whether the cause to which Zumalacarregui's death is ascribed, was the real one or not, but we believe that an English surgeon who visited him in his expiring moments was of opinion that he did not die of his wound; and it is said that the surgeons who attended him absolutely refused to allow his body to be opened.* Certain it is, that the news of his death was received with joy at the Court of Onate, and Don Carlos was congratulated by his courtiers upon being emancipated from the brutal despotism of his General. It is, moreover, quite true that the whole population of the provinces, whether in imitation of the "winning" and "chivalrous" manners of Zumalacarregui, or in pursuance of what their own feelings dictated, have entirely participated in the sentiments of the General towards Don Carlos. The absence of personal courage, and of all power to assert his authority, which distinguish Don Carlos, his general nullity in short, have caused him to be looked upon with indifference by some and with contempt by the major part of the brave and hardy peasantry who have been bidden by their

* Mr. Henningsen's language clearly implies his belief that he was poisoned.

priests and their chiefs to raise his standard. Don Carlos himself has frequently complained of the disastrous plight in which he has placed himself by returning to Spain, and has bitterly reproached those at whose advice and entreaty he was induced to come. He was rarely allowed to approach the coast, and Zumalacarregui always kept a trusty guard about his person, with orders narrowly to watch that he did not escape.

We believe the first female who was murdered in this horrible war was put to death by the Carlists. In May 1834, a young woman, 22 years old, was suspected of having given information to some Christinos, and she was ordered by Zumalacarregui to be shot, together with a child of fourteen. The custom of punishing women for political offences, or of visiting upon them the sins of their relations, is to the disgrace of Spaniards no novelty in Spain, where, when political fury is excited, the weakness of woman obtains for her neither compassion nor respect. The too famous murder of Donna Mariana Pineda, perpetrated at Granada, under the ministry of Calomarde, is one among many instances of the bloody zeal with which Spaniards seek to support the cause they espouse. Donna Mariana was a young and beautiful widow, of a highly respectable family, and the mother of two children; but for her misfortune, some of her friends entertained, or were suspected of entertaining liberal opinions. In an evil hour she commissioned two embroiderers to make a flag, having upon it the words—Liberty—Law—

Equality ; but she subsequently forbade the execution of her commission. The police, however, learned the circumstance, and having communicated it to the Government, they received instructions to entrap the individual from whom the order for embroidering the flag had proceeded. The police, by threats and bribes, induced the embroiderers to take home their unfinished work to the house of Donna Mariana. The bearer of it was followed by Alguacils and Escribanos, who on searching the house of course found in it that which they had just caused to be deposited there. For this, or rather for her supposed sympathy with liberals, was Donna Mariana Pineda condemned to death, and publicly gibbeted at Granada, to the horror of the whole town, and to the eternal disgrace of the Government of Ferdinand, and of that party whose mild and paternal sway the Tories of England desire to re-establish in Spain.

The treatment of women by Carlists, and more particularly during the command of Zumalacarregui, was revolting to human nature. During the early period of the war, when the Carlists took possession of, or even passed through a town, the disposition of which towards Don Carlos was doubtful, they seized the women whose husbands, sons, or fathers were serving in the Queen's army, or who were enrolled in the National Guards, stripped them, publicly exposed them, beat them in the market-places, and having tarred and feathered and tied

them upon asses, exhibited them to the gaze of the town. How many of these poor creatures would, in their agony, have envied the fate of the wretched mother of Cabrera? And can we wonder that an unquenchable thirst of vengeance should burn in the bosoms of the husbands, the brothers, the lovers of these women.

Here we shall close this sad subject, expressing our firm belief that, whatever atrocities may be charged against one of the contending parties, similar accusations may, with equal and horrid justice, be brought against the other. The Queen's side having the greater power of repression, has been, indeed, the most to blame of the two; but the Government is not so culpable as it may at first sight appear, judging of its conduct by that which regular governments are expected, and are usually able, to accomplish. If tranquillity had existed, and the authority of the law had been in force, then the Government that did not punish these savage excesses would have been deservedly doomed to the just execration of mankind: but in the midst of universal disorder, when the whole country was a prey to unruly passions, and the Government, placed between contending factions, was scarcely able to maintain itself, acts of justice and vigour were impossible. Captains-Generals, and military commanders, exercised their despotic will, and justified their measures by the plea of expediency. These were constantly disapproved by the Government,

but they were by no means displeasing to the excited passions of the public, and the Government had no other part left than to be blind to wickedness they could not chastise. This is one of the long train of evils inseparable from a state of civil war, and nothing would be more hopeless than, under such circumstances, to expect sound reason or judicious conduct from Spaniards, when selfishness and terror have called the worst feelings of their nature into activity. But history shews us that the evil is not exclusively of Spanish growth. Can excesses more revolting to humanity be committed, than those which have stained the popular commotions of the Dutch? have not unoffending men, and patriotic citizens, been murdered in Holland? and can it then be said, that the people of southern climes enjoy the unenviable monopoly of brutal passions? Let us look at home—let us examine what happens here, under our own eyes, with every circumstance most favourable to the prevention and punishment of crime, and we may then form an estimate of the difficulties against which a Government of Spain, in its present state, has to struggle. Some of the provinces of Spain are larger than Ireland; but it may be doubted if in the course of a twelvemonth, the balance of crime would not be against the sister island, and in favour of any province of Spain that might be selected. Yet, with all the authority of the law—with all the force of opinion—and with the long array of judges, magistrates, infantry,

cavalry, and police, all well disciplined, all having a common object, how hard is it for the Government to exercise its functions, when the people, unfortunately, do not recognise their own interest in the suppression of vice and crime. We beg our readers to call to mind the recent catastrophe of Bristol, and the enormous amount of property destroyed by a brutal populace, in the second city of the kingdom, at a moment of profound peace and unexampled prosperity. Let them remember the inefficiency of the military, and the cowardice of the civil authorities. We beg them to reflect upon the unsatisfactory nature of the investigations that afterwards ensued, and they may then form an estimate, though but an imperfect one, of the superhuman labour that would be required to enable a Government of Spain to control the actions, and to punish the offences, of thirteen millions of people, engaged in a struggle upon the issue of which they know depend their lives, their properties, and all that man holds dear.

One word more, and that word shall be one not of excuse, but of explanation of facts, in order that the *whole* truth should be notorious respecting the examples quoted by Lord Carnarvon of the excesses of the people of Spain, and of the system pursued by the Government, which his Lordship most unwarrantably designates (p. 310) as one "of massacre, abhorrent to every virtuous and manly feeling, and never exceeded by the worst men in the worst state of society."

Lord Carnarvon (p. 290) states that, in 1835, a Pole and some Frenchmen, persons of birth and education, who had landed in Spain to join the standard of Don Carlos, were taken by the Constitutional authorities, and, notwithstanding the humane remonstrances ineffectually made by some officers of the British Legion, were deliberately shot by order of the commandant of Santander, who pleaded in his justification the general, but positive instructions of his Government. Lord Carnarvon adds, that this took place long after the signing of the cartel. This is true: but if he means by that, that these men had any right to be included under its provisions, he is incorrect: they did not land, nor were they executed within the limits to which the Convention extended: they landed to the west of Santander, and having raised the cry of Don Carlos in the villages, they were seized and executed by the authorities. Sincerely do we wish that the humane intervention of the British officers had been effectual: but we will ask the Noble Lord if, in the Irish rebellion, five or six foreigners had disembarked near Cork, and had raised the French standard upon that coast, we ask, whether the commander of the King's troops, in that neighbourhood, would have hesitated to hang these intruders, and whether the Government or the public would have reprobated his so doing?

But so far from positive and general instructions being given by the Government, of the nature stated by Lord Carnarvon, the conduct of the Go-

vernment with respect to the twenty-seven Carlist officers taken at sea, while avowedly coming to join Don Carlos, is a proof of the contrary. These were all men of military rank and importance, who had served with Don Carlos in Portugal—who had been allowed to depart with him, and who, like their master, had contracted a moral obligation, not to return to the Peninsula, for the purpose of disturbing its tranquillity—their lives were spared though clamoured for by the people of the port where they were landed—they were placed where they were considered most secure from popular fury, and when the Government became apprehensive that they were exposed to danger, they were sent to Puerto Rico, with directions that every attention should be shown them as officers and gentlemen. When arrived there, so slight was the restriction to which they were subjected, that we believe the whole of them have found their way to Don Carlos, and are now serving in the insurgent provinces.

The massacre of Barcelona was indeed equal in horror to that of the worst excesses of the French Revolution—but it was not as those were, an act of atrocity without an exciting cause ; it was an act of savage retaliation for the massacre of a number of prisoners whom the Carlists had carried to a fortified castle. That castle was subsequently besieged by Mina. The prisoners to the number of 170 were thrown over the ramparts, and were either killed

by the volleys of musketry fired at them as they fell, or were dashed to pieces on the rocks below. These unfortunate men were all inhabitants of Barcelona, and nearly at the same time that the intelligence of their massacre reached that town, news arrived also that a company of National Guards and a detachment of a regiment of the line which had left Barcelona to escort the mail, had been surprised and slaughtered by some Carlist bands lying in wait for them. Public exasperation was in consequence raised to the highest pitch, and nearly a hundred unfortunate Carlist prisoners were butchered on the same day. But so far from the Chamber of Proceres refusing to institute an enquiry upon the subject, as is stated by Lord Carnarvon, such enquiry was with great difficulty prevented upon the ground of informality; but addresses to the Crown upon the subject were presented by both Chambers, and the Minister of the Interior read the dispatch of the Government to General Mina, deploring the event and calling upon him to execute the powers of punishment with which he was invested. In fact, some of the ringleaders were seized and transported by General Mina to the Canary Islands. Immediately upon the news of the massacre reaching Madrid, the government sent off extraordinary couriers to every place where Carlist prisoners were confined, and ordered the authorities to redouble their vigilance for the protection of their prisoners. These are the facts, and we en-

treat a comparison of them with the statement of Lord Carnarvon.

With respect to the massacre of the monks at Madrid, in July 1834, the whole truth is equally well veiled, for though it is true, that these monks "had committed no crime," it is not true, that to them "none had been imputed, and against them no accusation had been ever raised." This occurrence took place at the time of the breaking out of the cholera, and the populace of Madrid, like that of almost every great town (not excepting even "Modern Athens,") where that scourge of the human race has made its appearance, sought to attribute it to some human cause, and then to take vengeance upon the supposed authors of the calamity. In Russia, the mortality was attributed to the physicians—in Hungary to the nobles—in Paris to the Jews, and in Madrid to the monks, who were supposed, in hatred to the liberal inhabitants of the town, to have poisoned the fountains; the people rose up against them, and in the six or seven hours the tumult lasted, many unfortunate victims of popular ignorance and fury perished, to the disgrace of the troops and National Guards, who might have prevented these foul deeds. The Prime Minister was at that time absent with the court at St. Ildefonso, but by the telegraph, he ordered the immediate dismissal of all the civil and military authorities, and the Captain-general was brought to a court-martial.

One more statement of Lord Carnarvon's it is necessary to notice—"that immediately after the King's speech, Spanish atrocities increased to a great extent." Verily, his Lordship's credulity must have been sadly practised upon, when he made this declaration, for we take upon ourselves to affirm, that the speech of the King of England had as much to do with the increase of crime in Spain, as that of the President of the United States. An infinitesimal portion of knowledge of Spain, is sufficient to make any man aware that Spaniards never know nor care about what is passing in other countries, or what is thought of them by foreigners, for whom they entertain almost Chinese feelings of disregard. The King of England's speech was little circulated in Spain—it could have been read but by very few of those who took part in the popular excesses, and upon those into whose hands it may have fallen, it must have produced an effect the very reverse of that imagined by Lord Carnarvon, because it was obviously an exhortation to the Spanish Government, to use in its administration of affairs that prudence and vigour which the speech made mention of; and the more those qualities were exerted, the less would necessarily become the chance of impunity for the anarchists.

But the historical fact does not bear out Lord Carnarvon's assertion, any more than the habits of the Spanish people do his arguments.

For it so happens, that, with the exception of the inexpressible act of Mina and Nogueras,* atrocities did not increase, nor was "the Eliot convention more decidedly violated." The massacre at Bar-

* Enough has been said in the course of these remarks to exhibit our feelings of indignation at the assassination of Cabrera's mother. They are quite equal to any which can animate Lord Carnarvon, and we have therefore no hesitation in condemning his attempt to appeal unduly to the feelings of his readers against the Spanish government, by painting the horrid transaction with the false colours of poetical imagination. Lord Carnarvon (p. 324) says that Cabrera's mother, "if her friends speak truly, was no less venerable for her virtues than her years." The unfortunate woman was of the lowest class—of that class which in Spain has few friends to speak for them—the extremely poor. She was distinguished by no particular virtues, and her rank in life is sufficiently designated by the occupation to which her son was devoted upon the breaking out of the war—that of "Sacrificer" in a village church.

"A woman convicted of no crime but of too great love for her son, and too great devotion to her God," (p. 324). Where are Lord Carnarvon's proofs of either? He has none. He ought to know that these were not the grounds upon which the unfortunate creature was executed; and his appeal against the Spanish government is ungenerous and unjust. He keeps out of view the atrocities of the son, for which the mother was barbarously killed, and when in his turn Cabrera retaliates and sacrifices thirty innocent women to the manes of his mother, no feeling of horror finds its way into Lord Carnarvon's breast. These women, we are left to suppose, might have been guilty of crimes, and might not have been devoted to their sons, or to their God. The son is merely said to have triumphed over the man (p. 330), and the crime is palliated by the provocation received. The partiality of Lord Carnarvon must shock even the most indifferent of his readers.

celona took place a month before the King's speech, and not only was the Eliot convention at that time *religiously observed* by both parties, but a better understanding existed between the two generals than at any former period. Flags of truce and communications between the respective head-quarters were of constant occurrence, and General Cordova frequently sent his prisoners without escort to the Carlist camp with a message to their general, that an equal number should be returned in exchange. Subsequently, at the request of Mr. Villiers to General Cordova, a proposal was made to Villareal to extend the provisions of the Eliot treaty to those provinces where the civil war had become organized. The negociation at first promised a favourable result, but it was broken off by the Carlist chief.

We are convinced that Lord Carnarvon is incapable of misrepresentation, but he has been deceived in the quarters from which he has obtained information, and the spirit of party in which, as it seems to us, the chapter on the Basque Provinces was written, prevented him from analysing statements which coincided so exactly with his views; but as the British public is never indisposed to hear both sides of an argument, we have thought it right, though perhaps at a tedious length, to perform the task which Lord Carnarvon neglected.

We have thus far, and merely for the sake of argument, treated the subject of the war in the manner conveniently adopted by Lord Carnarvon,

of regarding the belligerent parties as placed under equal circumstances ; but it is hardly necessary to add, that we utterly deny—and we are sure that every reasonable man will agree with us in so doing—the justice or the truth of that assumption. The Queen is in possession of the throne, of the towns, of the fortresses, and, with the exception of thirty or forty square leagues, of the whole of the territory of Spain. The colonies acknowledge her authority, and the revenue and resources of the country are at her command. She is supported by all the important classes of society, and her government has all the attributes with which legitimate sovereignty can be invested. Don Carlos occupies a corner of the Peninsula, makes war from the shelter of its mountain fastnesses, and is unable to extend his authority, or to assert his claim to a throne, which he has never ascended, and from which he has been lawfully excluded. It is an idle fallacy then to assert that the belligerents are upon equal terms ; and none but party writers would consider them so. What would have been said in France if, during the late revolution, La Vendée had been considered upon equal terms with the rest of the country ? Who would not have laughed if an advocate of the Duchess de Berri had insisted upon claiming equal rights for that princess in the little war she waged against the King of the French ?

The Carlists are rebels in arms against their lawful Sovereign ; humanity and prudence forbid

their being treated with all the severity applicable to their condition, but law and justice would permit it.

It is with regret that we here discontinue the easy work of reviewing Lord Carnarvon's book, because we feel that, in fulfilment of a duty to the public, the errors and mis-statements with which every page abounds ought to be exposed, and it is solely with reference to the slender and fleeting interest which foreign affairs excite in England, and the little inclination which men have to devote time to the consideration of such matters, that we are induced to abstain. We will, however, follow Lord Carnarvon to the postscript to his chapter upon the Basque Provinces, and like him we will offer a few remarks upon the events which have taken place within the last four months in Spain, and upon the position which that country now occupies with reference to Europe.

We again repeat that the British Government never has, and never could have, supported a democratic party in Spain. Their object and their interest was to uphold moderate men, and to establish a moderate system capable of regulating the progress of improvement in the Peninsula. At the time of Ferdinand's death there was every prospect of the experiment being attended with success. Those prospects have since been as variable in their aspect as the military events upon which they became dependant. The chances of success never

have been, and are not now extinguished ; but we affirm, that had they been incomparably less than they were, England adopted the most judicious course upon the death of the King; and had the chances of success become since that time incomparably worse than they have, it would have been mean and ungenerous, and therefore unwise, for England to have withdrawn her support from her ally, or to have shrunk from the consequences of her own act. Lord Carnarvon and his party contend that the judicious course for us would have been, to remain neutral—not to have pronounced between the contending parties, that is to say, to have imitated the Northern Powers, and of course then to have followed their example throughout, and ultimately to have found ourselves, like them, without influence and without agents in one of the most important countries of Europe, during a contest which, whatever may be its issue, must so materially affect the future destinies of Europe. To the Northern Powers who have no immediate interests in the Peninsula, no ancient relations, no ties of neighbourhood or commerce, and who wished well to the weaker and at that time headless party, such a course was practicable, and for their purposes might be judicious ; but this is the very reason why a contrary course became expedient for us, for we have in the Peninsula all that those powers have not, and it is idle to say, that our general system of policy is not opposed

to theirs—it might, perhaps, be more correct to say, that their policy is opposed to ours.

The course then adopted by the Holy Alliance with respect to Spain would have sufficed to point out to us that which it became us to pursue if we had stood in need of any guide for our conduct. But if we had acted as they have done, the Peninsula, and English interests in connexion with the Peninsula, must have fallen into the grasp of the Powers of the North. They would, without consulting us, have acknowledged Don Carlos at the moment most convenient to themselves, and we should have had to choose between being left alone in our neutrality, or recognising the Queen, and entering into a contest with the Holy Alliance in Spain, and thus endangering the peace of Europe, or lastly following in the wake of the Northern Powers, and acknowledging Don Carlos. Then would inevitably have followed our being forced to acknowledge Don Miguel. Small thanks should we, indeed, have got from those two amiable Princes, for a course which we should have been compelled unwillingly to adopt; but towards their benefactors of the Holy Alliance justly deep would have been their gratitude, and that gratitude would have been of the kind which is most to be relied upon—namely, a lively sense of favours to come. And this feeling would have rendered Carlos and Miguel the merest slaves and tools of their despotic protectors.

The Peninsula would thus have become an outpost of the Holy Alliance in the west. It might have cost them some trouble and expense to maintain the colony, but the possession would have been theirs; and the east of Europe would have been the mother country of the Peninsula. Now, we put it not to Tories, or Whigs, or Radicals, but to *Englishmen*—to those who think the great commercial interests of their country worth protecting—to those who regard the influence of England as the most powerful medium of general good, and the surest stay of general peace,—to those who value our national honour, and to whom the glorious recollections associated with the Peninsula are dear,—we put it, in short, to every class of our countrymen, whether, if we had permitted such a state of things, we should not have been degraded in our own eyes, and dishonoured in those of Europe? And yet the policy which would have led to such national degradation, is that pointed out as the fitting one for England by Lord Carnarvon, and, as far as we are able to judge, by the majority of the Tory party. These politicians conveniently leave out of their calculations the important consideration, that France, without consulting with us, or looking at any thing (as she had a most perfect right to do) but her own interest, lost not a moment in recognising the Queen, and in offering troops for the support of her cause; and yet we were to have remained neuter, and to have

excluded ourselves voluntarily from all influence over a contest, in the issue of which we had so much at stake ! Had we remained neutral, notwithstanding the active part at first taken by France, the establishment of the Holy Alliance in the Peninsula, as anticipated above, would have been little, if at all delayed ; for, judging from the dispositions which the French Court has manifested during the last two years towards the Northern Powers, no one can doubt the facility with which France might have transferred her recognition from Queen Isabel to King Carlos, or the sacrifices which might have been extorted from the latter in return for this abandonment of principle. *Then* what position would England have occupied ? The position of one betrayed, and jeered at by false friends. And the English Ministry ? Why, it would have been overthrown by the indignant voice of the whole nation, roused to a sense of its degradation by the very Tories who now hold so opposite a language.

But the joint recognition of the Queen by England and France at once cut short these difficulties, and has tended, perhaps, more than any other event, since the revolution of July, to preserve the peace of Europe. The Ministers of the Northern Powers hovered for a while round that phantom of a despotic throne, on which their falsely prophetic imagination had seated the semblance of their arbitrary King. But on the signing of the Quadru-

ple treaty, these birds of ill omen took their flight from Madrid ; just as the British Minister would have been compelled to do, if Lord Carnarvon's policy had been adopted, and if those powers had signed *their* treaty in favour of Don Carlos. But, baffled and disappointed of their expected prey, these powers retired from the contest, and left to England and France the most glorious field of honour that was ever opened to two powerful nations. Had the same spirit in which it may be supposed the Quadruple Treaty was signed, continued to animate all the contracting parties to it, how magnificent might have been the result, not only to Spain, but to Europe.

The alliance between England and France, brought about by fortuitous circumstances, but cemented by reciprocal interests, had become the guarantee for the peace of the world. There is in that alliance a combination of force, and an unity of purpose, such as Europe has never before seen, but which she at once acknowledged to be irresistible ; hence every art, every intrigue, and every threat have been put in play by some, to dissever this hateful compact. The self-love, the ancient rivalry, and extinguished suspicions of both countries, were in turn resorted to, but in vain,—the edifice remained unshaken ; but the rudest shock of all had yet to be given, and it was hoped that by the levers of rival interests, as connected with Spanish affairs, the foundations might be up-

heaved, and the superstructure brought to the ground. Well was the Spanish question fitted to test the sincerity of the English and French alliance. If upon that question the two countries could understand each other,—could lay aside the remembrance of olden times, and if they could meet for a common purpose, and with a common interest, on the very ground where for so many years, and twice at the interval of a century, their principles and their armies had come into conflict; then, indeed, the triumph of the alliance would be complete—there could then exist no *arrière pensée*, or hollowness in it,—its advantages must be clearly seen, and its certain results be confidently expected. All these anticipations were embodied in the Quadruple Treaty. No jealousies or exclusive feelings, on the part of England, with respect to Portugal, found their way into that compact. None on the part of France regarding Spain. The interests of the two countries were identified, and our purpose became the same. The moral force of England and of France was raised to its highest pitch, for all the world acknowledged that what the two Powers willed, must come to pass, and that resistance to their will was idle and useless.

This proud position having been taken by England and France, they have however not reaped from it all the advantage which lay within their grasp. France has coldly turned her back upon the joint undertaking in Spain. She views our

steady perseverance with fretfulness and dislike; and the Holy Allies are already beginning to triumph in the anticipated consummation of their efforts, and in the expected fulfilment of their prophecies.

We regret this state of things, and we candidly confess ourselves unable to account for it. A clearer-sighted, or more sagacious prince than the present sovereign of France never sat upon a throne—his own position and the interests of France appear perfectly well defined, and yet France has pursued a policy with respect to Spain which seems to us inexplicable. By some it is thought that the French Government wishes to pursue the ancient policy of France, and to keep Spain in beggary and disorder, as the best mode of preventing her being useful to England, or dangerous to France; others again consider that France has tamely succumbed to the haughty menaces which have been conveyed to her from the North. We believe in neither of these accusations. We believe that, however much the French Government of the present day may admire, or might desire to imitate the policy of Louis XIV., they must be well aware of the difference between the state of Europe in those days, and in the present times, and they must feel that another Louis XIV. has now become a political impossibility; on the other hand we more than doubt that the ministers of France can have crouched to the will of the Northern Powers, for they know

that to do so would be to undergo unrecompensed humiliation. These Powers do not look upon the present dynasty of France as legitimate, and with them want of legitimacy will never find favour or pardon. They spurn the power which placed that dynasty on the throne, and they delight in heaping mortifications upon a head which has been crowned by the hands of the people. Still, however, we cannot wonder at these suspicions having been entertained—they were justified by the *fast and loose* policy of France towards Spain. At one time ample professions and niggardly assistance have been given to the Queen, at other times when her cause seemed gaining ground, powerful, though underhand, support has been afforded to Don Carlos: a desire, in short, has seemed to exist that the resources of the country, and the energy of the combatants should be completely exhausted, in order as it were that France should then step in and arrange matters authoritatively as best might suit her purpose. If such was the case, this policy contained no one element of success. Territorial aggrandizement for France in Spain would not have been permitted by the rest of Europe. France of 1830 would not have tolerated the setting up of Don Carlos upon the throne by French means,*

* We know it is said, and it is even affirmed that proofs exist of the favourable dispositions of Louis Philippe towards Don Carlos, and that he is only waiting for the proper moment of giving effect to them. We disbelieve it, because Louis Philippe knows that the

and Spain would only have endured the imposition of political institutions by foreign bayonets, so long as those bayonets actually occupied the country—the day the foreigners crossed the frontiers, the pent up passions both of Carlists and of Liberals would have been let loose, and civil war would have re-commenced under every circumstance of aggravation that could make Spain formidable to France, and inconvenient to Europe. The only policy really open to France was the one best suited to her interests. France had recognised the Queen who had all the force which possession of a throne can give. Her Government was supported by all the aristocracy, by the wealth, the talent, the industry of the country—by all those classes in short which constitute the substance of society, and whose interests are the most opposed to revolution. But still that Government was weak and unable to maintain itself between contending factions ; it represented the *juste milieu* which, in France, is so much sought after by some, and by others so unjustly ridiculed, for the term rightly interpreted

stronghold he has upon his people consist in his being thought the *King of July*—the elected of the revolution ; and long may that feeling continue to prevail ! upon it hangs the peace of Europe ; for in the hearts of Frenchmen there exists an indestructible sentiment of hostility against the counter-revolution, and we are convinced that any open attempt to favour the pretensions of Don Carlos would be viewed by the vast majority of the nation, with the same alarm and disgust as an alliance with Henry V., and that it would be attended by similar consequences.

can only mean the steering clear of extremes and poising equally the balance of power between parties, when the preponderance of either might endanger the state. The attempt may be ridiculed as Utopian, but it cannot be denied that in proportion as this system can be realized, in the same proportion is an advance made towards that which is yet a desiderandum in good government. The Spanish Government was in a position to have made the experiment with success, while its supporters were full of hope, and its opponents were not yet strong : but owing to the civil war they felt themselves gradually sinking, and they implored France to extend her friendly hand to save them ; they represented that the dangers of their position affected not only Spain, but Europe, and that in their salvation, France had as great an interest as they had themselves. Their prayers were not listened to, and the language of the French cabinet was, that it mattered not to France whether Spain was delivered over to the bondage of Carlism, or sunk in the abyss of Jacobinism ; that to France this alternative was merely a question of having more or fewer troops upon her frontier. But shortsighted is the policy which cannot perceive that cordons are impotent against contagion, and that bayonets are no barriers against opinions ! and how truly is the prophecy from Spain coming to pass ! Troops upon the French frontier have not been wanting, but the state of Spain has not the less

failed to agitate France. Already has it compelled the King to dismiss from his councils the able Minister who possessed and merited his confidence. Already has the military insurrection at La Granja had its baneful effect in France ; the example of the non-commissioned officers of the Spanish army has not been lost upon the ambitious and discontented men who compose the corresponding class in France. The Spanish question now threatens the existence of the French Cabinet : and if either extreme should triumph, and if Carlist or Republican principles should prove victorious in the combat, daily increasing dangers would await the tranquillity of France, and the throne of her King.

The armed assistance of France was solicited in June 1835, and we affirm, without the slightest fear of contradiction on the part of those who have any knowledge respecting the war in Spain, and who have no interest in putting forward that which is not, that if the French army then upon the frontier, had made three days' march to the southward, the insurrection would have disappeared in precisely the same manner as that of Portugal did upon the entry of the Spanish troops, in virtue of the Quadruple Treaty a twelvemonth before. We go farther, and we affirm in the same positive manner, that the arrival of a French army would have been hailed by the Carlist chiefs, and by the majority of their troops, and of the population of the insurgent country, with equal or greater satisfac-

tion than by the army and generals of the Queen. The Carlists were wearied of the contest—they hated its duration, but saw no prospect of its being brought to an end. They at the same time, however, felt it a point of honour not to yield to their own countrymen, and they preferred continuing the war to surrendering to a government, in whose pardon a consciousness of the manner, in which they themselves would employ victory, forbade them to confide; but this was their language—provide us with the means of laying down our arms without disgrace (*entregar las armas sin vileza*)—give us the excuse of saying, that resistance has become hopeless, and the war on our part shall immediately cease. And the language of these men was judicious, for they knew what was most fitting for their honour and their interests—they knew that there was no hope of victory for them, but they also knew that if they yielded, when a powerful foreign force had come in, victory could not be claimed by their enemies. They had a right to expect also that the intervening would at the same time be a mediating Power, and that when there were neither victors nor vanquished, peace would not be followed by persecution.

The author of these remarks speaks from data he relies upon, and he has no fear of contradiction; he does not draw upon his imagination for his facts, nor does he attempt to dress out his facts in the language of poetry; for it is in the highest

degree poetical to say (p. 136), "that the insurrection has been carried on under circumstances which prove that it originated in no slight grievance or passing disaffection, but in a deep sense of religious duty to their king, their country, and their God." Who have been the commanders of the Carlist forces? Zumalacarregui, Villareal, Torres, Gomez, and the like; all officers of inferior ranks, turned out of the Queen's army, who, having lost their pay, went to seek their fortune elsewhere. How have they manifested their sense of religious duty? We have already shown how they honour their adopted king; and we take leave to say, that we should have been more disposed to concur with Lord Carnarvon in admiring their sense of duty to the Almighty if they had united, under favouring circumstances, to put an end to a fratricidal war, and to throw a veil of oblivion over the past. It may be true that "the present Government of Spain (p. 340) will find it no easy matter to achieve the conquest of the free states"—but it will not be because "blockade cannot easily reduce that people, favoured as they are by the fertility of a soil which yields a crop immensely exceeding the annual consumption of the country." At the time that the frontier was closely guarded by the French authorities, and when the line of the Ebro was simultaneously blockaded by the Queen's troops, the Carlist army was reduced to the utmost destitution; and desertion from its ranks increased daily;

the deserters saying, upon arriving at the headquarters of the Queen's general, that they came in order to satisfy the cravings of hunger. The war, at that moment, promised to be brought to a speedy conclusion, when all at once, and as if for the purpose of prolonging it, the frontiers of France were opened, and corn and provisions, and stores of every kind, were poured in with the utmost abundance. Whenever the supplies from France shall cease, the war must come to an end; these supplies must, however, in the mean while be paid for dearly; and when, in June, 1836 (probably for want of the necessary funds, for let or hindrance there was none on the frontier of France), Don Carlos was compelled to resort to the most oppressive measures for supplies, he justified them upon the ground of being compelled "to rescue his army from being left totally without the means of subsistence." And so far from the country being (p. 340) "still determined to maintain the armies of their choice by every public and private sacrifice," such measures have always produced disgust, and made the people desirous of peace at any price. Equally incorrect with all the rest, is the assertion (p. 340) that "enlistment is not avoided as an unwelcome summons to fatigue and danger, but is courted as the only road to honour and independence." Enlistment is avoided in the Basque Provinces by every possible means—it can hardly ever have been called voluntary; and in the whole

Carlist army, which Lord Carnarvon is pleased to state at upwards of 100,000 men, but the moveable portion of which does not exceed 25,000, there are not at this moment 8,000 men natives of the Basque Provinces, the remainder being made up of deserters from the Queen's army, prisoners who have preferred to take service rather than be locked up in a dungeon, and Castillians kidnapped by force, and who court this "road to honour and independence," with about the same alacrity with which the Negro on the Coast of Guinea courts the "summons" of the slave-dealer. We leave our readers to judge of the deep sense of religious duty to their king, their country, and their God, which must animate two-thirds of the Carlist army !

Had it suited the inexplicable policy of France to permit the restoration of tranquillity in the Peninsula, and had she used the means which were in her hands for securing it, how much bloodshed, and what a vast amount of human misery would have been spared to Spain ! what anxiety and danger to Europe ! And this effect would have been as easy as its results would have been humane and glorious ; the expense to France would merely have been the difference between the peace and war pay of the troops employed, far less than the money expended on a corps of observation, on the farce of guarding the frontier, and seizing a few gun-flints, some lumps of lead, and some pounds of salpetre ; the French troops so employed would

have been fatigued by no long marches—they would not have had to fire a shot—and they might have returned to France within three months, having completed a great work of humanity.

If Louis Philippe is ambitious, as it is said, of being styled the Napoleon of Peace, he has missed a rare opportunity, in Spain, of acquiring a right to the title. He has missed a rare opportunity likewise of rendering service to France, by extinguishing the anarchical and Carlist parties now struggling for supremacy in the Peninsula; and from both of which he has so much to fear at home. Whichever of these parties triumphs there must be danger to France. But, on our conscience, we believe that he has more to apprehend from Don Carlos on the throne, than from the Jacobins in the ascendant; for the triumph of the latter would be short. No revolution can be successful which is not supported by the bulk of the nation, and in Spain the bulk of the nation is not revolutionary—the country would be disgusted by the excesses of the anarchists—rival interests and the spirit of federalism would spring up—each province would separate itself from the others, and govern itself as it could—every kind of domestic disaster would follow; and the good sense of the people of France would make them look upon such a state of things as a warning, and not as an example.

But were Don Carlos seated upon the throne, what, in the present state of public opinion in

France, might not be expected from the uneasiness and angry excitement such a neighbour would create? The South of France is Carlist; and there would then, indeed, be no Pyrennees; for Southern France would join with Spain against a common enemy—and that common enemy would be “France of 1830.” Can it be supposed that the Inquisition and the priesthood of Spain would bear any good will to a king made by the people? to the Constitutional Government or to the free press of France? Would they not look on Henry V. as the only lawful King of France; and would they, or could they, form any other real alliance than with the Powers of the North, who would then have in Spain the means for eternally agitating France, the object alike of their hatred and their fear? The Carlists of France are at this moment a dormant power—they are insignificant because they have no open support from within or from without; but let their head-quarters be once established in Spain, let all the resources which the Church party in Spain have at their command be employed in their behalf, and it would not be long before we saw them assume a consequence and a consistency rendered trebly formidable by the encouragement they would receive from abroad, and the ready assistance they would meet with at home, from that too numerous party, which pants for disorganization and plunder.

That the Inquisition in all its horrors would be

re-established in Spain upon Don Carlos ascending the throne, is no longer a matter of doubt with those who are acquainted with the principles and the objects of the persons by whom that Prince is surrounded. It is notorious that when a short time since, and at a moment of his greatest necessity, Don Carlos was offered the assistance of Austria, (which would have been followed by that of other Powers) but upon the condition of his promising an amnesty, and not to re-establish the Inquisition — *he refused* assistance coupled with such conditions. Perhaps he did so unwillingly, for he is not a free agent; and he may have been compelled by those who rule him thus to announce the system which would characterize his reign. Bloody and ferocious as were the deeds of the church party upon the re-action in 1823, their unvarying language since has been that the country had not been sufficiently cleansed of every liberal stain; that blood enough had not been shed; and they were in a constant struggle with the King, who thought it politic at length to check the ministers of Christ in their merciless career. To their not having been allowed fully to work out their ends, they now attribute the disasters which have befallen them, and their vengeance would now be of a far different kind from that which they wreaked upon the unfortunate liberals in 1823. The Inquisition would be established in every village—its loathsome dungeons would be crowded

with victims—new tortures would be invented for the friends of the Queen ; their property, and those of their remotest connexions, would be confiscated ; and the daily labours of the hangmen in every corner of the country, would attest the numbers of those who had declared against a system, built upon desolation, and cemented by blood. When Gomez passed by Guadalupe with his prisoner, General Flinter, the brave but unfortunate defender of Almaden, the monks issued from their convents, armed with gun and knife, and intreated of Gomez *to lend them Flinter for an hour, that they might drink his blood.* This is no exaggerated specimen of the conduct which the church party would pursue, the day, the moment, they had the power. And could in the 19th century a state of things be tolerated in Europe which would have disgraced the 14th ? Impossible. But let not Europe be deceived ; the apostolical party in Spain listens to no advice ; they understand their own interests in their own way, and are deaf to all remonstrances. By force alone can they be turned away from their wickedness ; and public opinion in France would compel the use of that force if that party were to succeed. But against whom would such force be brought to bear ? Against Don Carlos, the ally of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Rome ? Would these Powers allow the child of their adoption to be molested ; and would their resistance calm the excitement of France ? Louis

Philippe would be placed between two dangers ; and it would require all his ingenuity to select the lesser of them, and all his vigour to act upon his choice.

Notwithstanding the impetus which the success of liberal institutions in Spain must give to public opinion in other countries, we are inclined to believe that the general policy of the Northern Powers would have been best served by at once recognizing the Queen, and by endeavouring to extinguish, instead of to foster, the hopes of Don Carlos ; the consequences of the Queen's early triumph would only have been developed gradually ; to give prosperity to a country so long misgoverned as Spain has been, must be the work of time, and much might have arisen to retard it ; but the Queen's throne would have been supported by all the important classes of the country, and her Government would have been in the hands of men whose principles and whose interests were on the side of order. Liberal principles would have made their way ; but the enlightened despotism (*despotismo ilustrado*) which was the motto of the early partizans of the Queen, would have been modified gradually. This state of things might not have been agreeable, but it would not have been hurtful to the Northern Powers, particularly if they had read the signs of the times at home, and with wise precaution had begun to prepare their own subjects for improvement ; for how little is sufficient to inspire

feelings of gratitude and content, when spontaneously bestowed on a nation by a royal hand !

With the Queen, then, peaceably settled on the throne, the Northern Powers might have foreseen that whatever they had to fear was within their own management. But they ought to have foreseen that it would be far otherwise with respect to that which they most, and justly dread,—namely, revolutionary contagion. They ought to have foreseen that the whole body politic of Europe was likely to be affected, when so important a member as Spain became diseased ; and that a protracted civil war in Spain could not fail to have dangerous consequences elsewhere. They might have known that when all the wealth, the rank, and the intellect of the country were ranged on the Queen's side, they could not and would not submit to the bloody fanatics, and to the ignorant masses by whom Don Carlos is supported. They should have been aware that the conflict lay between intellect and numbers ; and that the Queen's was in reality the conservative cause, and that of Don Carlos the cause of revolution.

We will not do those Powers the injustice to believe that they ever attempted to settle the affairs of Spain by a marriage between the Queen and the son of Don Carlos : a project of which the wisdom is more than once hinted at in Lord Carnarvon's work. We believe that their ignorance of Spain, and of Spaniards, was not so great as to lead them

to suppose that such an arrangement could be possible ; nor do we believe that they wished so ill to that unfortunate country as to advocate a measure which would for ever deprive it of all hope of tranquillity. The first question indeed would be, whether such an arrangement would meet with the concurrence of the parties whom it would most concern ; and we believe that both are too well convinced of their respective rights ever to entertain such a project. But were this difficulty surmounted, a plan for placing two antagonist principles upon the same throne, and for ensuring the co-existence of two rival and exasperated parties, incapable of compromising their difficulties, is a plan for sowing the seeds of eternal civil war. Its monstrous results might be exemplified in a thousand different ways, were the proposition any other than a crude notion thrown out for party purposes : but we are convinced that the evil consequences of such a scheme must strike every man who will take the trouble of thinking upon the infinite mischief which this plan for tranquillizing Spain would produce.

The Spanish question has not been rightly understood in England, either in its general character or in its detail, nor is this to be wondered at, for setting aside the indifference which characterizes us, when Foreign affairs are in question, we admit that in many essential points Spain differs from every other European country, and as the Spanish ques-

tion is generally viewed and argued upon according to our experience, and by the analogies drawn from the history and character of other countries, the question becomes embarrassed rather than illustrated by discussion. The nature of the Government, moreover, from which Spain has been recently emancipated cut off all channels of information, communication of ideas was forbidden, political connexion was dissolved, and every element for the formation of public opinion was insulated, so that men, who had equally good means of collecting information and of forming opinions as to the wishes and wants of the country, and of the probable success of the different parties engaged, have frequently on the same spot arrived at the most opposite conclusions. It was therefore naturally to be expected that erroneous judgments should be formed and should continue to be formed abroad of a country which is but hastily visited by travellers, and where no two provinces entirely resemble each other; where the inhabitants are prone to conceal the truth, sometimes from pride, sometimes from jealousy, sometimes from habitual fear, and very generally from a spirit of boasting exaggeration, which is perhaps the only feature in the character of Spaniards which may be said to be universal.

These are some of the general causes of the errors and mistakes prevalent in other countries with respect to Spain, and many others exist which are incidental to the peculiar circumstances in which the

Peninsula has been placed during the last three years. The channels, through which intelligence has flowed from the Peninsula to Europe, have been corrupted for political, financial, or party motives have more or less influenced those who have undertaken to enlighten the public ; and when to this is added, an imperfect knowledge of the country, the people, and the language, it is not surprising that so much error has been propagated and so little truth has been permitted to see the light. For three years Spain has been the great gambling-house of Europe, both politically and financially speaking. Every writer on Spanish affairs has had his party, his paper, or his job, together with his prejudices, his passions, and generally his ignorance of every thing but his own objects. What was to be expected but falsehood, tricked up in a thousand different guises ?

Had this not been the case, and had the Spanish question been broadly stated and fairly argued in England, there would have been less skirmishing upon its outskirts, and the Government would not have been exposed to the guerrilla fire, which has been directed against it in Parliament. The interests and objects of England would have been made apparent, and we believe the good sense of the nation would have strongly pronounced itself in favour of the Government, and would have condemned any attempt to increase the difficulties which both the English and Spanish Government

had to encounter in bringing to a successful conclusion the contest upon which so much depended for both countries. It would have been seen that a little weight thrown into the balance would have decided the question in our favour, (we say *our*, because the more the subject is considered, the more we know it will be felt that the cause of the Queen is the cause of England in Spain), but that the want of that little caused the prolongation of the civil war with all its attendant horrors and revolutionary prospects. And we cannot permit ourselves to doubt that a trifling sacrifice would have been made, if it had been clearly demonstrated, that political advantages would have been its result to England; and that humanity and the cause of good government required it in Spain. We repeat, that every step onwards in revolution in Spain has been caused by the civil war alone; and that the Government or the system which had the good fortune to put an end to that war, would have been that with which the nation would have been contented; but the duration and the disasters of the war exhausted the country and exasperated the people. Changes of government effected by noisy brawlers were sanctioned by the nation in the hope that new men might bring with them new vigour, and put an end to a state of things which had become intolerable. If Zea had crushed the war in its birth, Zea and enlightened despotism would not have fallen. Martinez de la Rosa and the Estatuto

Real were overthrown by the military failures which occurred at the latter period of his administration. Mendizabal would have continued Prime Minister of Spain, if he had been able to fulfil his promises of terminating the struggle ; and the cry of the Constitution put an end to the calamitous Government of Isturiz, chiefly because that Government, beyond all preceding ones, was distinguished by military reverses. After each change, the nation has paused, watching with breathless anxiety the consequences of their act, and has abstained from any fresh experiment, until their disappointment in the preceding one became no longer doubtful.

We deplore the mode in which the Constitution has been established in Spain ; we feel the dangers of the precedent ; and we admit that all those unacquainted with Spaniards were justified in anticipating grievous calamities from the event. But the manner in which things in Spain turn out, contrary to every ordinary calculation, was never more exemplified than with respect to the Constitution ; for not only has the aspect of affairs improved since it was proclaimed, but we venture to assert that there is not another people in Europe who, under such trying circumstances, would have exhibited such moderation as the Spanish nation have shewn.

The unfortunate Quesada was accessory to his own death ; had he followed the advice of his friends, or the commonest dictates of prudence, the infamy of his assassination would not have weighed

upon his countrymen, and he might long since have found himself as safe and as well protected at Madrid as he had been at any former period of his life. During the last few days of the Isturiz ministry, Quesada, with no common personal courage, sternly performed what he believed to be his duty. He disarmed the National Guard of Madrid—he dispersed the rioters by force—and he proclaimed his intention of executing a large number of them on the day on which he himself afterwards ceased to live. At that moment the news arrived from La Granja that the Queen Regent had sworn to the Constitution, had ordered it to be proclaimed in the capital, and had displaced the whole of the authorities. Quesada concealed himself for a few hours; but, deaf to the entreaties of some faithful friends, he persisted in riding out of the gates of Madrid at mid-day, along the high road, and without any attempt at disguise. He was recognized, immediately pursued by a mob of ruffians, and most inhumanly butchered. His name had long been hateful to the National Guard and populace of Madrid, and his death was hailed with savage exultation. The people were at that moment without authorities, without law, and in all the dizzy excitement produced by a transition from a state of siege, to one of the most uncontrolled liberty;—yet the blood of Quesada did not whet their appetites for more. Not another wound was inflicted, nor was an outrage or robbery committed. Let it

be considered that this was a revolution scarcely less important and even still more sudden than the revolution of July. But no injury was done to the persons most implicated, who took the precaution not to expose themselves to the first burst of popular excitement. In France the ministers who had violated the Constitution were tried for their lives before the highest tribunal of their country several months after the commission of their offence ; and were afterwards, with difficulty, saved from the fury of the mob, in order to be consigned to imprisonment for life. The Spanish Ministers had suppressed, by an act of authority, the liberty of the press ; their administration had been distinguished by many unpopular acts, whether justly or not, the military disasters which had for three months followed each other in rapid succession, were attributed to their mismanagement : and, lastly, they had disarmed the National Guard of Madrid, and had proclaimed martial law in the capital of Spain. Within a week after the proclamation of the Constitution, three of these ministers were walking, unmolested, about the streets of Madrid, and one of them has since been appointed by the Government to one of the most important posts in the gift of the Crown. The remaining three thought proper to leave the country ; but it is to be observed that these three had, up to the moment of taking office, been the constant advocates of ultra-liberalism, and were there-

fore ill looked upon by all parties. A petition, neither numerously nor respectably signed, was presented to the Government demanding the trial of the ex-ministers. It has never since been heard of. No measures against them have been taken, or even proposed by the Cortes, and their names and their deeds are passing rapidly into oblivion. We believe that in few countries, even among those laying claim to greater civilization and humanity than Spain, under similar circumstances, would similar moderation have been displayed.

The new Government gathered up the scattered elements of force which still remained, and gradually established their authority. They convoked the Cortes under the law of the Constitution, which is framed as if for the purpose of securing a democratical Convention, and again, contrary to all expectation, the Cortes have exhibited a degree of moderation and good sense, which would do honour to the first legislative assembly in the world ; they have conferred the Regency upon the Queen-mother, during the minority of her daughter,—they have been constant in their desire to render the Government strong, and have passed by large majorities, and notwithstanding their extreme severity, the exceptional measures demanded by the Government,—they have already made great progress in the reforms of the Constitution, in order to adapt it to the wants of the country, and to place it in harmony with other Constitutional Governments,

and above all, they have displayed a determination not to consent to revolutionary measures; and the bad faith and folly of a few Deputies, have only served to organize a powerful majority, and to display the spirit of moderation by which that majority is animated. All the detailed machinery of the Constitution, which rendered it as a system of Government utterly impracticable, is already abolished—the establishment of two Chambers is agreed upon—the absolute veto, and the power of convoking, proroguing, and dissolving the Cortes, have been granted to the Crown, and Deputies are now capable of being appointed Ministers, which they were not before, and thus one of the grossest of the innumerable defects of the Constitution has been removed. To preclude the Crown from selecting a ministry from the majority of the Chamber, in a representative system, was an absurdity, resolutely defended by the Cortes of 1820, but immediately acknowledged, and corrected by the Cortes of 1836. By the Constitution as it stood, a Minister could not be elected to be a Deputy while in office, or during a twelvemonth after quitting office, and thus the country was deprived of the services of men whose official and practical knowledge might be useful in the Cortes, and who must be the best able to watch and control the administration of their successors. The Crown, on the other hand, was disabled from selecting a Deputy to fill any post for which his talents or his

services rendered him fit. These and other Constitutional blunders, have been corrected, after debates which do infinite credit to the Deputies, and are of happy omen for the continuation of the career, which they have so wisely begun.

Military successes likewise—that indispensable element of strength to the Government of Spain—have not been wanting. General Iribarren surprised, and made prisoners a column of 1000 Carlists, and a still greater number of prisoners were taken in La Mancha, belonging to Gomez's corps. Cantarieja, the stronghold of the Carlists in Aragon, and the centre of their operations in that province and Valencia, is now in the possession of the Queen's troops. Maroto has been beaten in Catalonia, and he himself compelled to seek refuge in France. The expedition of Sanz to Galicia, consisting of 3500 men, utterly failed, and hardly 1000 men got back to Navarre, where their accounts of the sufferings they were exposed to from privations of every kind, and from the hostility of the people, will, we have reason to believe, prove to the insurgents the impolicy of again descending from their mountain holds. The expedition of Gomez has also been of signal advantage to the Queen's cause; advantage dearly bought, it is true—but gained, and not to be disputed. That expedition has proved, that whenever the Queen's generals really choose to look for and to attack the Carlists, they will always find, and beat them; for Gomez, with 12,000

men, was met and completely routed by Narvaez with 4000. That expedition further proves, that either there exists no sympathy for Don Carlos in the greater part of Spain, or else that the party favourable to his pretensions is too timid or insignificant to shew itself. Gomez was pursued, it is true, or rather followed by a division of the Queen's troops, from which however it was evident he had little to fear; the authorities, and generally the National Guards, fled upon his approach; in all the country he overrun there was hardly a regiment of soldiers, and no obstacle whatever existed to a general rising in favour of Don Carlos, if the people had been really in his favour. Lord Carnarvon's opinion, that Gomez did not raise the country on account of the difficulty of arming the people, is quite incorrect: he did attempt it every where; arms there would have been no difficulty in providing, and Gomez, when he left Navarre, carried with him a large quantity of spare arms; a convincing evidence of his object. But arms would not have been necessary, if, with the 12,000 men he had with him, the country had been with him also: the 5000 troops that were following in his wake would have been exterminated.

The people submitted to Gomez and to the robberies and atrocities of his band because they had no means of resisting; but except in one or two insignificant places not a manifestation was made in favour of Don Carlos, and in those places order

was instantly restored upon the return of the local authorities to their functions. In the retreat of Gomez, as well as in that of Cabrera, who had separated from Gomez sometime previously, the Carlists were harassed on all sides by the peasantry, and the stragglers were hunted down and killed like wild beasts.

In Galicia, the Asturias, Leon, Castille, Aragon, Valencia, Andalusia, Estremadura, Murcia, and La Mancha, in short, in nearly the whole of Spain which has been traversed by Gomez it is manifest that the people *are not disposed to take part with Don Carlos*—a fact which has been always asserted by the partisans of the Queen, but which required for its demonstration the confirmation which has been given to it by the occurrences of the last six months. Gomez levied exorbitant contributions in every town—he plundered the plate and jewels of the churches—his soldiers robbed and maltreated the inhabitants—the individuals of most consequence were every where carried off prisoners, and many were murdered, when through fatigue or weakness they were unable to keep up with the rapid marches of this horde of demons, who swept the face of the country like a plague. It is not to be wondered at that Carlism has become abhorrent to the people of the South, or that these missionaries should be viewed as dread forerunners of the wrath to come, if those who sent them should ever enter upon the exercise of their destroying vengeance.

Another service has likewise been rendered by Gomez to the Queen's cause. He has every where changed the tone and bearing of the extreme liberal party—they resemble drunken men who have been sobered by a sudden alarm. Before the arrival of Gomez they were overflowing with boasting and defiance; they fled upon his approach, and afterwards when contemplating the scene of havoc which they had returned to, they felt the insufficiency of volunteers, and Juntas, and proclamations, and they acknowledged the necessity of having a Government, and of making that Government strong by all the force which union can bestow.

The feelings of this party, and their crude or exaggerated notions of liberty, have undergone a complete change, and an approximation of the Carlists to the Liberals has grown out of the change. Thus when Cabrera with a considerable force approached the town of Quintanar de la Orden, the Royalists joined with the Nationals and beat off the enemy. A sense of common danger united these men in a common cause, and the kindly feelings produced by reciprocal services, and by the necessity of reciprocal support, are calculated to be enduring.

From all those elements, then, of confusion and chaos, which presented themselves in Spain five months since, with an aspect so lowering, order is at length beginning to issue, and hope for the first time dawns upon that unhappy land. The hurricane

of political passions has subsided, but the traces it has left behind are awful evidence of its fury, and inspire an unmixed horror of its possible return. Weariness and exhaustion are on every side manifest, and the all-prevailing feeling is a desire for repose. The people of Spain with one voice implore for peace, and thrice blessed to them will be the hand that gives it. For peace they are now fitted. Experience, bought by misery and bloodshed, has taught them its inestimable value. Experience will teach them to preserve it, and the past will become the best security for the future. With a nation thus disposed, how noble and how light are the labours of a Government, with power not inferior to its will for perfecting the materials which a concurrence of accidents has placed at its command—how many wounds are there to heal—what misfortunes to repair—what differences to compound—what an impenetrable veil to be thrown over the past !

This is no idle dream or fancy sketch of an unreal state of things—it is possible, it is practicable, it would be certain, if the Government had the strength necessary for meeting the wishes and wants of the people. How little is required to impart that strength ! and upon what straws do the destinies of nations as of men depend ! The subjection of fifty square leagues of mountainous district to the lawful sovereign of Spain may seal the happiness of the Spanish people. In that little

area is the centre and heart of that system which may ensure their misery. A mortal blow given there, the members of that system will become inanimate, and its arteries will no longer flow. Carlism would be dead, and with it would cease to exist the spurious spirit of liberty which it fed and kept alive. The moment is propitious, but it is fleeting. The guilt and woe, and all the acts of desperation, which timely succour will avert, may be estimated by all, and heavy is the responsibility of him who with calculating coldness permits that ill which he has the ability to prevent.

Spain is in need of succour. Spaniards may again become desperate—may again be plunged in crime. England has the power to prevent it, and England may deeply rue the day when she turns a deaf ear to a nation imploring her aid. Shall it be said that the House of Commons of England, who unhesitatingly purchased with millions the right of striking off the shackles from the slave; who in the purest spirit of philanthropy have dealt out with bounteous hands the means for abolishing an inhuman traffic—shall it be said that they will hesitate to save a nation of freed-men from returning into bondage? If humanity did not forbid the thought, self-interest should make us pause before we reject an opportunity which may again perhaps never occur. Set aside every great and generous motive, let our considerations be sordid and speculating, and still we ought to proceed. The part-

nership of France should first be invited in our enterprise, for we seek no exclusive advantages for ourselves; we have a common interest with her, and our joint success in Spain, would render omnipotent our moral force in Europe. But should France still persist in her present Machiavelian policy, still we should proceed; nay more, we should view it as an additional motive for proceeding, for the interests of France in restoring peace and moderate government in Spain are so manifest, that it must require some strong motive to induce the French Government to continue to sacrifice those interests. What then is that motive? Is it a desire to level a blow at England? Does the French Government dread the advantages which England might derive from Spain when prosperous and free; and has this fear for three years guided the conduct of France? If such were the case, we should say such policy is short-sighted and ill-founded; we should deplore the event which produced coldness in relations which ought to be enduring; but we should feel that England is rich enough, and strong enough, and bold enough to pursue single-handed the course which humanity dictates, and which is most conducive to her honour and her interests. She has done so before, and she is not degenerated now. How trifling too would be our outlay—how great and how rapid our return. The guarantee of a loan, for which Spain is able and willing to give ample security, would

provide for the exigencies of the state, and would render the Government politically strong ; a land force which should occupy the frontier of France, and which south of the Pyrennees should carry into effect that article of the Treaty which France has failed to execute to the north of those mountains, would blockade the Carlists in their rocky citadels, and would re-organise and reanimate the Spanish army. The British standard would be a pledge that what England undertakes England will perform ; and in a few short weeks we should not only have the glory of finishing this fratricidal war, but should find ourselves in the proud position of having established peace upon a lasting foundation.

Spain would not expect this boon unconditionally at our hands ; but the conditions we should impose would be honourable to her government, and advantageous to her people, and we should then throughout the changes with which the political horizon of Europe is now big, possess in Spain an ally whose resources and geographical position, and friendly feelings would be to us of inestimable value ; and whose liberalised system of commerce would offer a market for our productions, such as no other country in Europe could afford. In Spain, moreover, better than in any country of the world, that great want of England, the means of employing profitably her surplus capital, might be found. The corn, the fruits, the wool, the innumerable wines

of Spain want but the hand of industry and the improvements of skill to bring them to perfection and to command the markets of the world. Her enormous church and national property is yet unsold, and the investment of foreign capital in such purchases is invited by the government and desired by the people. The resources of Spain are yet unexplored, they are mines of gold whose precious products are at the command of those who choose to search for them, and will take the trouble to remove the obstacles by which they have hitherto been concealed. Let Englishmen undertake the work and well will their industry be rewarded, and well will that government deserve of the country, which knits our political alliance with the Peninsula, by the bonds of material and reciprocal interests.

It is into this vast field of combined political and commercial speculation, that we trust the Spanish question will be carried in the ensuing Session of Parliament, and should His Majesty's Ministers fail in the performance of a duty which their good fortune (in our opinion) has imposed upon them, we entertain a confident hope that independent members of the House of Commons will not be wanting to rouse the attention of the people of England to a subject in which they are so nearly concerned, for certain we are that he will successfully appeal to all classes of his countrymen who calls upon them to support the commercial prosperity, and the political glory of Great Britain.

Since the preceding pages were written, two events important in their bearing upon the Spanish question have occurred. The relief of Bilbao and the French speech from the throne.

Every resource which Don Carlos could command, all the energy his partizans could display, his best generals, his foreign engineers, his picked battalions, and the whole of his artillery, all were concentrated against Bilbao. The importance of taking the place was magnified by the Carlists, and the certainty of the event was announced far and wide by their agents both at home and abroad. The simple natives of the provinces were assured that the recognition of their King by Foreign Powers would follow His Majesty's entry into the city, and that foreign gold and foreign troops would open the road from thence to Madrid, while the ex-Chargés d'Affaires of the Holy Alliance at Madrid, who were permitted, as embryo Ministers to Don Carlos, to hold their congress of *Dii minores*, and to play their diplomatic high life below stairs at Bayonne and Pau, re-echoed the Carlist assurances, and as the agents of those Powers have always done throughout from the year 1832, led their Courts into error respecting what was passing and what was to come to pass in Spain.

Bilboa is completely commanded by surrounding mountains, and as a military position, and accord-

ing to the rules of art, is indefensible : these mountains were all occupied by the Carlists. Every local advantage was deliberately and without opposition turned to the best account, and yet during nine weeks did the slender garrison of regular troops, the twelve hundred National Guards, and the inhabitants of that heroic city resist every attack ; and the besiegers were at length driven from their heights which *should* have been impregnable, by seven battalions of the Queen's troops, leaving behind them the whole of their artillery, their ammunition, and provisions, and flying themselves in utter rout, confusion, and dismay.

What, then, are we to think of the military power of Don Carlos, when the *élite* of that army of 100,000 men, with which he has been so liberally endowed by Lord Carnarvon, almost in the heart of their own country, lacking for nothing, unmolested from without, and in the advantageous positions selected by themselves, were unable to take possession of the town they commanded, or to overcome its National Guards, the only time they dared to enter the breaches they had made : and when we see these chosen patriots and hardy mountaineers unable to hold, against an inferior force, those heights which, on the 24th of December, bristled with the bayonets of thirty Carlist battalions, but where, when the day dawned on the 25th, not a single Carlist soldier was to be seen.

The relief of Bilboa, by the Queen's army, is a

brilliant military achievement. In any country, and in any army, it would be reckoned so, when the difficulties which were overcome are considered—the bridges which were to be made—the forts that were to be stormed—and the heights which it was necessary to carry by assault—all under commanding fires, and in a night of storm, and snow, and of intense cold, such as is rarely felt in southern latitudes; when the soldiers crept, for warmth, under the heaps of dead; many of them without shoes, in linen trowsers, and with a handkerchief tied round as the only covering for their heads; yet, most of these men had volunteered for the assault, and well do they deserve the glory they have earned.

Compare this deed of arms with a recent unfortunate event in Africa, and in all sincerity we say unfortunate, because we desire to see France powerful both at home and abroad. So far from being animated by any petty feelings of jealousy, we look upon it as our interest that France should be all that her position, her boundless resources, and the character of her people, so well entitle her to aspire to. We know her interests are identical with ours, and we believe that when those, who rule her destinies, arrive at a becoming consciousness of power, there will be an end of all desire to court a foreign yoke under which the rulers may pass, but under which the people will not follow.

We regret, therefore, any reverse which may

befal France, and we heartily wish we had no such point of comparison to resort to ; but let our readers compare the abundant supplies and excellent clothing of those veteran soldiers of France, with the half-starved, half-naked condition of the Queen's troops ; the short march of the former, and the one snow-storm which occurred on it, with the month's bivouac of the latter upon marshy ground, and in an almost unceasing tempest. Compare the old Moorish fortifications of Constantina, against which an experienced Marshal of France considered 7,000 men were more than a sufficient force, and his inability to enter by the gates which he had thrown down ; with the river, the forts, and the heights which the Carlists had in their favour, and the desperate resistance which, for awhile, their superior numbers and positions enabled them to make. Compare all these, and we shall see cause for admitting that the relief of Bilboa is a splendid deed of arms.

And what shall we say for that "chivalrous feeling of honour" (p. 344) in Don Carlos, "which, within the sphere of his authority," according to his noble biographer, "has respected the property of persons actually in arms against him : " what will our readers say to this, when they know the manner in which the siege of that unfortunate capital of the enthusiastic Basques was carried on ? Bilboa was not even summoned to surrender ; but, during the first three days and nights, was bombarded by six-

teen pieces of heavy artillery. Upwards of 2,000 rounds of shot and fire-balls were sent into the town—many houses received four and five shells—the general devastation was tremendous, and the firing only ceased when the ammunition was exhausted; it being evident, from the manner in which the batteries were constructed, and from the defending lines not being attacked, that the real intention of the Carlists was, to burn or destroy every house in the town: and be it remarked, that this fiendish assault of a Prince upon his fellow-countrymen, and, as he hopes, future subjects, was not the work of “Navarrese enthusiasm,” or of one of those men who, by enlistment, had “sought the only road to honour and independence;” but of a Frenchman, whose promises and whose projectiles had merited the entire confidence of Don Carlos.

This was not all, however; for had the relieving army delayed but a few hours longer, all that remained of Bilboa would have been levelled with the ground: the mine, which was to have blown up the town and the inhabitants, had already reached its termination, and Espartero saved the women and children of Bilboa from the chivalry of the Pretender, whose army we can only suppose was, in this instance, acting without the “sphere of his authority.” We trust that the British public will, henceforward, no longer be imposed upon by tales of that Prince’s respect for the property of his enemies. Perhaps, indeed, as the men of Bilboa

entertain opinions so different from those of their brother Basques, they may be considered to be without "a sense of religious duty to their king, their country, and their God;" and to have deserved, therefore, the fate that was prepared for them. But here, again, we have another sample of the system which would be universally pursued by the Carlist party against their opponents, if the means of exercising their vengeance should ever be in their power.

The failure at Bilboa, after all the glorious results of success which had been promised, has, as may well be supposed, scattered dismay and dejection among the partizans of Don Carlos in the North of Spain. They had staked their all, and they have lost it. The greater part of the insurgents would at this moment lay down their arms, if they did not fear the ill consequences of submission, to themselves and their families; and had we now the British standard in Biscay, with the small force necessary to give confidence to the insurgents, we should be able to mediate between the belligerents and to bestow peace upon the country. The Queen's Government desires but peace, the Basques would be no more molested than Carlists in other parts of the country are, and there would be even a greater interest in conciliating them; but still we fear that from the character of the combatants neither will of themselves come to an amicable settlement; and the nature of the country will prolong the war, unless a third party intervenes to propose an ad-

justment, which both will be ready to accept. We are doubly anxious that this work of philanthropy should be undertaken by England, since the solemn announcement which the French Government has made by the Speech from the Throne, that France will not intervene in favour of the Queen of Spain—a declaration which the Carlist will look upon as rather more important than the accompanying *vows* for the consolidation of the throne of Isabella.

Without entirely throwing off the outward forms usually observed upon such occasions, it would have been difficult for the French Minister to have drawn up a speech more hostile to the Queen's cause.—“Fatal dissensions still disturb the Peninsula”—“Serious events have shaken the institutions at Madrid”—“Spain has been incessantly desolated by civil war.” Not a word of the gradual consolidation of those shaken institutions, not a word of the conduct of the Cortes, or of the anti-revolutionary spirit which is on every side springing up, or of the little sympathy which the Pretender's cause found in the provinces which have been traversed by his bands—not a ray of hope for Spain, in short, appears, and the speech only applauds the French Government for having departed, with respect to Spain, from that policy which sent the “children of France” to shed their blood at Antwerp, and to offer battle at Ancona.*

* We have alluded only to the King's Speech, for the quibbling speeches of his Ministers are but embarrassed comments upon that text. They have, moreover, been dissected, analyzed, and scattered

We have no right to doubt that which the speech so solemnly states, that France is still closely united with Great Britain, as regards the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, and our Government should therefore join with those of Spain and Portugal, and invite the fulfilment of the 4th article of that treaty, by which it is stipulated, that "if the co-operation of France should be deemed necessary by the High Contracting Parties for the complete attainment of the object of this treaty, His Majesty the King of the French, engages to do in this respect whatever might be settled by common consent between himself and his three august Allies." If the invitation be rejected, we then urgently repeat; Let England singly do the work, and singly reap the

to the winds by the arguments and powerful eloquence of M. Thiers, and by the honest and open statement of facts made by his late colleagues:—"Look at the Treaty," says M. Thiers, "Portugal gave an army, England a naval force, and France gave nothing but promises. These promises evidently meant succour. If they were given and meant succour, then to refuse it was to break the Treaty. If the promises were given and meant nothing, then the French Government has meanly sought to dupe England and Europe. * *

* * * Others talk of moral support given by France. But the only moral support is the certitude that France will aid Spain if aid be necessary; and this moral support has not been given, but withdrawn. Nay, the refusal of succour has thrown our moral support altogether to the Carlist side."

"As to the Quadruple Alliance," says M. Sauzet, "the use you have made of it has been to give promises and break them; excite hopes in the weak, and withdraw them in the hour of peril. You have made it a great weakness and a great lie."

reward—let us establish the Queen's authority; humanity and the peace of Europe render necessary the trifling sacrifice, by which this might be accomplished, and we need have no fear with Lord Carnarvon, that the royal tenure in Spain (p. 342) will have the same inherent taint as "the Bourbon dynasty in France, which was replaced on the throne of that country, by a foreign force."

Why, however, in order to exemplify his case, did Lord Carnarvon go out of Spain, where he might have found a parallel example, to seek a foreign one, which is not so. Louis XVIII. was placed, and for a time supported upon the throne, (after many doubts of the Allies as to the policy of allowing the Bourbon dynasty again to reign in France,) by the armies against which France had been so long fighting, and whose presence and support might have been sufficient to secure the national hatred for the king thus imposed. But by whose exertions was Ferdinand placed on the throne? Did British support give an "inherent taint" to *his* tenure? Did Spaniards during the Peninsular war look upon "British troops not only with political aversion, but as the natural enemies of their faith?" None of all this, but the contrary of all this occurred, and hence it became necessary to look in other countries for a case which does *not* apply to that of the Queen of Spain.

A few troops sent to Spain, to which Spanish divisions would be attached, and a guarantee of a

loan for which ample security might be given us, are all that is wanted to make Spain tranquil, and England even more honoured and respected than she already is. We repeat our hope that such a measure may be proposed by the Government to Parliament, or by Parliament to the Government, and that it may be executed with the energy and determination that should always characterize the policy of England.

Of the success, no man who knows any thing of Spain, can possibly doubt.

THE END.

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The Policy of England, towards Spain considered chiefly with reference to '
A Review of the social and political State of the Basque Provinces, and a
few Remarks on recent Events in Spain ... by an English Nobleman'

London 1837

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